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CLIMATE CHANGE, SUSTAINABILITY, AND 
THE FAILURE OF MODERN PROPERTY 
THEORY 
JILL M . FRALEY* 
Property rights are, I argue, the single largest legal limitation on our ability 
to respond effectively to the climate change crisis. This is because our 
understanding of the scope of property rights shapes and limits legal concepts 
such as regulatory takings, land use law, common law tort and property claims, 
and statutory environmental regulation. Property sets our cultural norms 
about how much the government can or should control the uses of land. The 
goals of this Article are to (1) historically demonstrate the failures of socially-
oriented property theory as they are represented in the analytical framework of 
doctrines such as social utility and (2) advance a sustainable theory of property 
whose usefulness is demonstrated by that historical examination. 
From a common law model of property based on near complete control by 
private landowners, property theory evolved to a model of viewing property as 
a vehicle for managing the competing interests of the individual owner and the 
larger society. From this model of competing interests, modern property theory 
weighed in on the side of society, reframing property interests largely in terms 
of the community and social relationships. I argue that the social relations and 
community approaches as they have developed in the case law have 
environmentally failed us. 
Community-based concepts have permeated the common law of torts and 
property, nudged into statutes, and undermined and eroded the protections that 
had been available. This erosion emerged from ostensibly social concepts, such 
as social utility, that were so neutral and malleable that they became entangled 
with a norm of industrial productivity. Having developed that association, they 
proliferated through property and tort law, insulating defendants. 
To address climate change, we need strong federal environmental 
regulation, coupled with local access to effective common law claims as a 
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backup and safety net. Both of these must have a foundation on property's key 
true social utility, which is human survival. 
We cannot rely on the paltry and inaccurate framework of private owner 
against society as our social model of property, but instead we must give 
community-based concepts like social utility a true normative meaning, 
centered on sustainability and with land as the unique, finite, and foundational 
resource. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Property rights are, I argue, the single largest limitation on our ability to 
respond effectively to the climate change crisis. This is because our 
understanding of the scope of property rights shapes and limits not only relevant 
legal concepts such as regulatory takings, land use law, common law tort and 
property claims, and statutory environmental regulation but also cultural norms 
about how much the government can or should control the uses of land. As a 
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result, our theories of property-particularly how we define the scope of private 
rights to land-must change if we want a legal system that is positioned to 
respond to the climate crisis. The goals of this Article are to ( 1) demonstrate 
the failures of modem property theory as it has been incorporated into property 
doctrine (as concepts such as cost benefit analysis or social utility) and (2) 
advance a sustainability-focused theory of property whose usefulness is 
demonstrated by that historical examination. 
Property theory underpins and explains property law, which is, I argue, the 
foundational limit of environmental law. The extraordinary power and 
significance of property law within American law more generally creates this 
relationship due to the connections assumed and endorsed between property 
and liberty or individual freedom. 1 Environmental law is effectively impossible 
in a system where the theory of property espouses a model of near complete 
control by private landowners. Thus, when environmental regulation 
developed in the twentieth century, property scholars re-worked traditional 
ideas of the meaning of property.2 
Re-working property theory allowed scholars to argue for increasing levels 
of regulation based on a different understanding of the nature of those private 
ownership rights or entitlements. This reoriented property right is not about the 
relationship between a person and land but instead about the relationship 
between an individual and the rest of the society. 3 An entitlements model of 
this sort then tolerated a degree of regulation of private land, pushing back 
against the prior norm of absolute individual control of private property.4 In 
1. Eduardo Penalver writes, "Property rights enjoy almost mythical status within American 
political thought in large part because of this commonly accepted connection to individual freedom." 
Eduardo M . Penalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1890 (2005). Property in America 
not only has this mythical status but also one that has a commensurate perception of morality. See 
Thomas W . Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1849, 1849 
(2007) (arguing that no system of property can stand without a moral principle and that the American 
system does in fact operate with the assurance of such a principle). 
2. The view of private and social obligations as the defining map of environmental law and 
property is often shorthanded as the tragedy of the commons. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the 
Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244--45 (1968) (introducing this metaphor for the two competing interests 
and arguing that without regulation, the individual owner will exhaust resources to the detriment of 
society). 
3. From the perspective of the individual owner, arguably the value of property lies in the way 
that "property supposedly facilitates the individual ' s exit from the demands of community." Penalver, 
supra note 1, at 1892. 
4. As Smith explained, "No longer can the owner of Blackacre claim with much force that 
ownership entails the right to use the resource without interference." Henry E. Smith, The Language 
of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (2003). Smith concludes, 
"Thus, the idea that a property right is a right to a thing that avails against the world has been replaced 
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this approach, everything is imagined in the context of the competing interests 
of the individual owner and society. This framework also explains why both 
courts and property theorists continue to struggle with the degree to which the 
principle of exclusion is the central feature of property law.5 
Within the context of environmental law, the social relations theme of 
property theory could then address externalities, such as pollution, by endorsing 
more substantial environmental regulations. Society is seen then as the victim 
of the individual landowner; society is also the vindicator of sustainability 
through regulation. The idea then is to think of property as social rights, not 
absolute individual rights, thus promoting the regulation of private land. The 
value of community trumps the individual right, thus weighing in on the side of 
more regulation in the conflict between private owner and society.6 We still 
often hear this push, as though it has not yet been sufficiently successful. For 
example, in 2009 Joseph William Singer began an article by arguing, "Property 
is a social and political institution and not merely an individual entitlement."7 
His statement reflects the continuing need theorists feel to push back against 
the rights/entitlement/individual side of the spectrum. 
Within this model of competing interests, modem and progressive property 
theory weighed in on the side of society, reframing property interests largely in 
terms of the community as a quintessential legal value and a defining 
characteristic of what it means to have property law. While modem property 
theory has been highly fractured, a central feature, which is retained by the more 
recent progressive theory, is a social-relations approach that favors community 
over the individual. 8 This Article focuses on this feature not only because it is 
with the idea that a property right is only one possible entitlement plucked from a wide range of equally 
privileged results." Id. 
5. Among current theorists, Smith offers the strongest statement in favor of property as organized 
primarily around the value created by exclusion. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of 
Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1693 (2012). 
6. It is, of course, a fallacy to think that the individual owner and society are always opposed. 
For example, the value of stable ownership may weigh in favor of both the current owner and society 
more generally in the long term. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 
90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 538 (2005) (arguing that property law foundationally creates and defends 
value via stable ownership). 
7. Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 
94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1010 (2009). 
8. Progressive property also specifically focuses on social relationships and seeks innovation in 
terms of reworking concepts to respond to the ''underlying human values that property serves," in other 
words the community values. Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Penalver, Joseph William Singer & 
Laura S. Underkuffler, A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 743 (2009). 
Similarly, another thread of theory focuses on the idea of human flourishing and, similarly, aligns with 
the notion of community as a push back against the individual's desires. See, e.g., GREGORY S. 
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a strong thread in what is otherwise a loosely woven cloth but also because 
there is more evidence of the social-relations approach being utilized within the 
courts (via such mechanisms as social utility) and in environmental statutes (via 
the cost benefit analysis). 
This Article demonstrates how courts have adopted social utility as a 
marker of community. Social utility, which has its origins primarily in nuisance 
law, has proliferated to a variety of other property, tort, and environmental 
contexts. The problem is that the social value content in this concept is so broad 
and vague that it has been shaped into an economic and industrial focus, which 
ignores all other models of social value, including sustainability. 
The evolution and proliferation of the concept of social utility demonstrates 
how the social relations or community approach to property theory, with society 
aligned against the individual, is environmentally failing, at least as the courts 
are employing it. The idea of social utility has, in fact, undermined and eroded 
the protections that had been available under property and tort law.9 I argue 
that the community and social relations value is too general and without scale, 
both of which allow it to be manipulated by individual parties in litigation, 
generally in favor of the polluter. Community can be interpreted so narrowly 
as to potentially create reliance interests of the neighborhood in an existing 
industry, as seems to be recognized in cases such as the United Steel Workers 
case from Youngstown, Ohio, 10 or so broadly as to support a colossally 
destructive copper smelting plant due to the job and tax base it created for a 
large number of people. 11 Community as a value is both too broad and too 
narrow and may support what are, in fact, incommensurable goals. As a result, 
the court cases give us a history of the manipulation of community values 
within tort law. This history, however, also points us to a better framework by 
providing insights into the kind of property theory that would be necessary to 
support a legal system responsive to a climate crisis. 
ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PENALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY 81 (2012); 
Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
745, 760--72 (2009). 
9. See Jill M. Fraley, The Uncompensated Takings of Nuisance Law, 62 VILL. L. REV. 651 (2017) 
( explaining how the concept of social utility has diminished the protections of nuisance law to the 
degree that it creates judicial takings). 
10. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 
621 (1988) (discussing this case and others in the context of the property rights that might exist in the 
workers and community due to the existence of a business or industry); see also United Steel Workers 
v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264, 1265 (6th Cir. 1980). 
11. See Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658, 661 , 666-67 (Tenn. 
1904). 
98 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [104:93 
In the threads of modem and progressive property theory, there are 
occasional moments when land shines through as a part of the analysis, 12 but 
these are, I argue, too rare. A coherent language of property theory will be a 
language of land, a language of sustainability. To better support the efforts of 
progressive and other modem theorists, we must reorganize the debate 
altogether around the key values that will provide us with a workable future: 
conservation, sustainability, and even (I am sorry to say) rationing. 
Even without the climate crisis, the polarized owner-society approach is a 
losing game. It is too paltry of a framework to manage our resource dilemmas 
successfully in the long-term precisely because the analytical structures of 
property law have emerged around the assumed to be competing interests of the 
owner and society without regard to the unique nature of land as a limited and 
damaged resource, required for both the owner and society, as well as future 
generations. The underlying normative commitments of the existing scheme 
quite literally lack common ground. 
This Article advances a theory of real property centered on the unique 
nature of land as our universal and most foundational sustaining and limited 
resource. This approach should prove useful because to address climate 
change, we need strong federal environmental regulation coupled with local 
access to effective common law claims as a backup and safety net-both of 
which must have a foundation on a redesigned understanding of private 
property in society. This theory reorganizes the polarized debate around the 
individual owner and society, which has (perhaps unintentionally but also 
crucially) omitted land entirely from the equation, reformatting the 
relationships around the land itself. This theory responds to not only the climate 
crisis but also the more general failures of the community and social relations 
approach, which are insufficient for this task for multiple reasons. 
Next, and relatedly, community as a social value is too malleable to support 
a strong statement about property and climate change. Meanwhile, nothing less 
than a strong statement for sustainable land uses will support the level of change 
necessary to address the climate crisis. Social relations and community are 
about people. A sustainable property theory puts land before people because 
only by doing so can we ensure a future for the people. We must understand 
property as our sustaining landscape that must be protected. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides the background of 
property theory necessary to explain our current predicament, including the 
valuable changes made with modem property law and the challenges modem 
12. As much as I appreciate these efforts, I believe they often function more as poetry within 
philosophy, an aside rather than the central text. For example, Penalver speaks ofland, human activity, 
and memory. See Eduardo M. Penalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 829-30 (2009). 
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property law leaves for a sustainable future. Part II first explains the historical 
lens and then examines the relationship between property theories and 
environmental law within the first two eras: the common law era and the 
modem era of viewing the individual and society as competitors before the 
courts. Because it is the primary case study for the argument, I reserve 
evaluation of the current era for Part III, which provides a case study of how 
the community approach, as framed and integrated by the courts in the concept 
of social utility, has proliferated through the causes of action in tort law, 
undermining common law claims that could support environmental values. Part 
III argues that the concept of social utility has been framed in the community 
values espoused by modem property theory, and yet social utility has repeatedly 
served to undermine environmental goods by focusing instead on business 
development, jobs, and tax dollars to the detriment of the environment. 
Drawing on the history and examination of current property theory, as well as 
case law, Part IV proposes a new approach to property theory that is grounded 
in sustainability and reintegrating land into our definitions of property. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PROPERTY THEORY 
A. Early Property Theory: The Individual, Possession, and Exclusion 
Early property theory focused on the individual private owner's 
relationship to land. Unsurprisingly, much of early property theory primarily 
addressed the acquisition of property. 13 Focusing on acquisition meant that, 
particularly within the British tradition, possession formed the heart of 
ownership because it was the point at which property was bom.14 
13. See CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY & PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND 
RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 12 (1994). Initial acquisition of property is a central preoccupation of 
theorists because any theory of property must ground itself in some account of how initial rights were 
acquired from the great primordial commons. See John T. Sanders, Justice and the Initial Acquisition 
of Property, IOHARV. J.L. &PUB. POL'Y 367, 368-69 (1987). 
14. The British approach drew from the Roman tradition in particular. Under Roman law, land 
had to be continuously possessed lest another begin occupancy: quad nullius est, fit occupantis. 1 
JOHN ERSKINE, AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 257 (1871). The Roman approach 
emphasized labor, focusing on a system of property ownership that maximized utility. See Brian 
Gardiner, Squatters' Rights and Adverse Possession: A Search for Equitable Application of Property 
Laws, 8 IND. INT'L & COMPAR. L. REV. 119, 124-25 (1997). Possession effectively claimed not only 
"things which had not as yet fallen under the power of any proprietor, but [also] those which had been 
lost or relinquished by the former owner." ERSKINE, supra, at 257. Notably, however, Roman law 
limited each person to the land he could cultivate himself, thus distributing land broadly throughout 
the community. Gardiner, supra, at 124. 
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Possession, however, did not refer to occupation as much as to enterprise 
and cultivation.15 In other words, perfecting a claim of ownership required a 
change in land use to one that was less sustainable-i.e., from forest to pasture 
or from bog to field. 16 Philosopher John Locke's approach to labor supported 
these ideas with a theory of property acquisition that favored land use 
changes. 17 Locke summarized the rule of possession as follows: "Whatsoever 
he tilled and reaped, laid up and made use of, before it spoiled, that was his 
peculiar [r]ight."18 Carol M. Rose once explained that "first possession is the 
root of title" was the "maxim of the common law."19 
This British colonial approach to property theory settled into the common 
law via William Blackstone. Blackstone argued, "[O]ccupancy is the thing by 
15. See PATRICIA SEED, CEREMONIES OF POSSESSION IN ElJROPE'S CONQUEST OF THE NEW 
WORLD, 1492-1640, 26--27 (1995). Without religious and racial components, the basic legitimacy of 
claiming empty territory continues in international law. Unoccupied land without an indigenous people 
appears to be available to first possessors, perhaps even when those claimants are not sponsored by 
any nation-state (at least so far as property, not sovereignty or jurisdiction, would be concerned). See 
L. Benjamin Ederington, Property as a Natural Institution: The Separation of Property from 
Sovereignty in International Law, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 263, 265-66 (1997) ("Despite the absence 
of a state sovereign to give legal sanction to these rights, customary practice nonetheless has repeatedly 
recognized private property rights in terra nullius." ). 
16. For example, Pennsylvania's charter granted the right to claim land "not yet cultivated and 
planted." Charter for the Province of Pennsylvania-1681, YALE L. SCH. : THE AVALON PROJECT, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/l 7th_ century/pa0l .asp [https://perma.cc/36NR-62F3]. 
The early scholarly tradition agreed. Grotius explained, "[U]ncultivated land ought not to be 
considered as occupied." HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 202 (1925). Vinogradoff 
argued that occupation "for purposes of cultivation gives rise to a possessory right." PAUL 
VINOGRADOFF, THE GROWTH OF THE MANOR 80 (1905). 
Modern scholars have seen similar patterns. Laura Brace argued that the idea of cultivation and 
land "improvement" has centrally "affected attitudes towards property and ownership." Laura Brace, 
Husbanding the Earth and Hedging out the Poor, in LAND AND FREEDOM: LAW, PROPERTY RIGHTS 
AND THE BRITISH DIASPORA 5 (A.R. Buck, John McLaren & Nancy E. Wright eds., 2001 ). Carol Rose 
described possession's texts as "those of cultivation, manufacture, and development." ROSE, supra 
note 13, at 20. 
17. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287-88 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1988). 
18. id. at 295 . Of course, Locke limited his theory of property ownership significantly, by 
limiting acquisition of private rights to only "where there is enough, and as good left in common for 
others." Id. at 288. Locke explained, "[I]feitherthe [g]rass of his [e]nclosure rotted on the [g]round, 
or the [f]ruit of his planting perished without gathering, and laying up, this part of the Earth, 
notwithstanding his [e]nclosure .. . might be the [p]ossession of any other." Id. at 295. In terms of 
the origins of rightful possession, Locke explained "at the beginning, Cain might take as much [g]round 
as he could till, and make it his own [!]and," but he was obligated to "yet leave enough to Abel ' s 
[s]heep." Id. (emphasis omitted). 
19. Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 75 (1985). 
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which the title was in fact originally gained."20 Notably, as this approach rooted 
in British law, occupancy came not just to require residency or changes in land 
use but specifically to require as much change as possible, meaning a property 
claim was not established unless there was "full and complete utilization" of 
the property.21 
Early American cases emphasize the role of land use in establishing 
possession or occupancy. 22 Landowners sought to demonstrate their possession 
by taking land to a more developed state, such as was available within the 
context of the landscape. 23 Courts sought land use, such as could be "required 
by the character and situation of the lands"24 or "the circumstances."25 Courts 
particularly sought information about the development of land "for such 
purposes as it is capable" to establish proof of possession.26 A successful land 
use for the purposes of establishing possession was "an 
occupancy ... according to its adaptation to use."27 
The language of these cases emphasizes possession and property in terms 
of the maximization of development, often with a patriarchal attitude. When it 
came to land, the role of the owner was "subjecting it to the will and dominion 
of the occupant."28 Cases favored changes to the landscape itself when 
possible: "[C]ultivation, enclosure, or erection of improvements."29 
Early property theory linked possession with a key right of ownership: the 
right to exclude others. 30 The right to exclude others connects directly to the 
20. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1766), reprinted in 
PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 45, 51 (Robert C. Ellickson, Carol M. Rose & Bruce A. Ackerman 
eds., 3d ed. 2002). 
21. Pat Moloney, Colonisation, Civilisation and Cultivation: Early Victorians' Theories of 
Property Rights and Sovereignty, in LAND AND FREEDOM: LAW, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE BRITISH 
DIASPORA, supra note 16, at 31 . 
22. Courtney v. Turner, 12 Nev. 345, 352 (Nev. 1877) (requiring a "beneficial" use of the land 
to establish possession). 
23. See id. 
24. Allaire v. Ketcham, 55 N .J. Eq. 168, 170 (N.J. Ch. 1896). 
25. Courtney, 12 Nev. at 352. 
26. State v. Newbury, 29 S.E. 367,368 (N.C. 1898). 
27. Morrison v. Kelly, 22 Ill. 609, 624 (Ill. 1859). 
28. Courtney, 12 Nev. at 352. 
29. Quatannens v. Tyrrell, 601 S.E.2d 616, 619-20 (Va. 2004) (quoting LaDue v. Currell, 110 
S.E.2d 217,222 (Va. 1959)). 
30. Notably, exclusivity has been so soundly regarded as the central feature of property that 
social scientists tend to define property as a theory that "determines exclusive rights ." Timothy Earle, 
Archaeology, Property, and Prehistory, 29 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 39, 39-40 (2000). 
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role of property in sustaining lives.31 The right to exclude was firmly 
entrenched in British law before the American Revolution; it has been described 
as "the bedrock of English land law."32 Blackstone referred to property as "that 
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the 
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other 
individual in the universe."33 
Similarly, American property law has strongly emphasized the right to 
exclude.34 James Madison defined property as "dominion which one man 
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in exclusion of every 
other individual."35 Revolutionary era thinkers thought carefully about 
property and the right to exclude because, for them, property was inherently 
intertwined with the idea ofliberty.36 
31. One way of thinking of the right to exclude is to think in terms of scarce resources. "In an 
anticommons, by my definition, multiple owners may each exclude others from a scarce resource and 
no one has an effective right to use." Michael Heller, Empty Moscow Stores: A Cautionary Tale for 
Property Innovators, in PROPERTY AND VALUES: ALTERNATIVES TO PuBLIC AND PRIVATE 
OWNERSHIP 189, 190 (Charles Geisler & Gail Daneker eds., 2000). 
32. Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd. [1997] 2 WLR 684 at 706 (Lord Hoffman). With that said, 
Carol Rose has argued that Blackstone would have seen the right of exclusive possession as an "ideal 
type rather than [a] reality." Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 
YALE L. J. 601,604 (1998). 
33. Rose, supra note 32, at 601. 
34. Earle, supra note 30, at 40. 
35. James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS' 
CONSTITUTION 598 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
36. Jennifer Nedelsky has written about this intersection: 
To begin with, the problem of property arose for the Framers because their 
conception of it was inseparably tied to inequality. The link to inequality was 
liberty. Property was important for the exercise of liberty, and liberty required 
the free exercise of property rights; this free exercise would inevitably lead in 
turn to an unequal distribution of property. Property thus posed a problem for 
popular government because this inequality required protection; those with 
property had to be protected from those who had less or none. Without security, 
property lost its value. 
Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 162, 164 (1990). 
In this model the right to exclude also takes center stage. Nedelsky explains: "Property provided an 
ideal symbol for this vision of autonomy, for it could both literally and figuratively provide the 
necessary walls. The perverse quality of this conception is clearest when taken to its extreme: the most 
perfectly autonomous man is the most perfectly isolated." Id at 167. 
Notably, modem property theorists may also share this attitude toward property and liberty. 
Joseph Singer wrote, "Property law and property rights have an inescapable distributive component. 
As Jeremy Waldron explains, '[P]eople need private property for the development and exercise of their 
liberty; that is why it is wrong to take all of a person's private property away from him, and that is why 
it is wrong that some individuals should have had no private property at all ."' Joseph William Singer, 
Property and Social Relations: From Title to Entitlement, in PROPERTY AND VALUES: ALTERNATIVES 
TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP,supra note 31, at 3, 11. 
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Property scholars through the first half of the nineteenth century shared 
Madison's view. For example, Morris Cohen wrote in 1927 that "the essence 
of private property is always the right to exclude others."37 And later theorists 
have understood traditional property theory consistent with this focus. As 
Joseph Singer explained, "The classical view of property concentrates on 
protecting those who have property."38 
The U.S. Supreme Court has continuously supported this emphasis on the 
right to exclude. In 1979, the Court described the right to exclude as a 
"fundamental element of the property right."39 In the same case, the Supreme 
Court explained that the right to exclude is "one of the most essential sticks in 
the bundle ofrights that are commonly characterized as property."40 In 1982, 
in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Court noted, "The 
power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured 
strands in an owner's bundle of property rights.''41 More recently, in Lingle v. 
Chevron USA Inc., the court spoke of the right to exclude as "perhaps the most 
fundamental of all property interests.''42 
Scholars similarly emphasize the importance of the right to exclude in the 
traditional American concept of property. J.E. Penner and Thomas Merrill both 
argued that the right to exclude is the centerpiece of the concept of property.43 
Carol Rose agreed, arguing that the right to exclude is often considered a 
def ming characteristic for the institution of property. 44 
B. Modern Property Theory: Social Relationships and Community 
Modem property theory conceptualized property rights as rights against 
others in society. Such a model reduces the emphasis on the owner's private 
rights and invites more intense regulation of private land. Simultaneously, such 
a model pushes back against the idea of absolute individual control. Modem 
property theory is, in the words of Pefialver & Katyal, a "body of literature 
37. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1927-28). 
38. Singer, supra note 36, at 12. 
39. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979). 
40. Id. at 176. 
41. 458 U.S. 419,435 (1982). 
42. 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005). 
43 . J. E. P ENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 103 (1997); Thomas W. Merrill, Property 
and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998). 
44. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 711 (1986). 
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emphasizing the dialogic and social nature of property law and eschewing 
the ... static, individualist conception of property rights.',45 
This body of literature generally begins with Wesley Hohfeld, who re-
conceptualized property rights in the twentieth century by arguing that the 
central function of property was not to order the relationship between an 
individual and an area of land, but rather to order social relationships.46 His 
approach was not entirely new,47 although the social relations approach is seen 
as defining modem property theory. 
Hohfeld's approach became a norm for understanding property in the late 
twentieth century. Singer,48 Munzer,49 and Rose50 all reformulated property as 
a set of social relations. 
Singer argued "that the traditional classical conception of property centered 
around absolute control of an owner should be replaced by some version of this 
social relations model.''51 Singer emphasized the conservative and unyielding 
framework of traditional property theory, finding that "[t]he image underlying 
ownership is absolute power of the owner within rigidly defined spatial 
boundaries."52 He explained, "The classical conception is furthermore 
premised on widely shared norms of promoting autonomy, security, and 
privacy. Yet the classical model of property is distorted and misleading both 
because it is descriptively inaccurate and because it is normatively flawed."53 
Singer sought a new model because he had significant criticisms of the 
traditional model for property theory. Singer stated, "The classical model 
misdescribes the normal functioning of private property systems by vastly 
oversimplifying both the kinds of property rights that exist and the rules 
governing the exercise of those rights. It also distorts moral judgment by hiding 
45 . Eduardo Moises Pefialver & Sonia K. Katya!, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095, 
1101 (2007). 
46. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 720---23 (1916---17). Although Hohfeld's thesis has been highly 
influential, there are dissenters. See, e.g ., PENNER, supra note 43, at 2 (arguing that property is best 
understood as "the right to a thing") . 
47. Jeremy Bentham wrote, "There is no image, no painting, no visible trait, which can express 
the relation that constitutes property. It is not material, it is metaphysical; it is a mere conception of 
the mind." Nicholas Blomley, Landscapes of Property, 32 LAW & Soc'y REV. 567, 572 (1998). 
48. Singer, supra note 36, at 8. 
49. Stephen R . Munzer, Property as Social Relations, in N EW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 36 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001). 
50. ROSE, supra note 13, at 4 . 
51. Singer, supra note 36, at 4 . 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 5. 
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from consciousness relevant moral choices about alternative possible property 
regimes."54 Singer ultimately proposed a new approach: 
[A] conception of property based on social relations. This 
model reconceptualizes property as a social system composed 
of entitlements that shape the contours of social relationships. 
It involves, not relations between people and things, but among 
people, both at the level of society as a whole (the macro level) 
and in the context of particularrelationships (the micro level).55 
Laura S. Underkuffler highlighted the social aspect of property by defining 
property as "the resolution of conflicting claims and conflicting desires for what 
are often external, physical, finite goods."56 
Similarly, Harold Demsetz described property rights as "instrument[s] of 
society [that] derive their significance from the fact that they help a man form 
those expectations which he can reasonably hold in his dealings with others. 
These expectations find expression in laws, customs, and mores of a society."57 
Demsetz focuses on what property gives a private party within a social 
context. According to Demsetz, "An owner of property rights possesses the 
consent of fellowmen to allow him to act in particular ways. An owner expects 
the community to prevent others from interfering with his actions, provided that 
these actions are not prohibited in the specifications of his rights."58 
In many ways, there is nothing new about the social relations approach to 
property. Blackstone's famous formulation of our affection for property 
contains words that belie the social nature of property-concepts such as hold, 
dominate, and control. 59 Such concepts only make sense in relation to other 
individuals. There is no need to dominate, hold, or control if you have no 
competitors. Therefore, although Blackstone spoke to private property, he 
outlined the rights in a way that set them in opposition to others in the 
community. So perhaps it is no surprise that most recent scholars of property 
theory situate themselves within the social relations approach to property.60 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 8. 
56. LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 143 (2003). 
57. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights (1967), reprinted in THE ECONOMICS 
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 31 (Eirik G. Furubotn & Svetozar Pejovich eds., 1974). 
58. Id. 
59. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at 45-52. 
60. See Penalver & Katya!, supra note 45, at 1101 (citing themselves as members of the ongoing 
discussion). Penalver and Kaytal cite to the following scholars and works as contributing to the 
developing literature on social relations and property: 
GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS 
OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970, at 1 (1997); ERIC T. 
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Adjusting to viewing property through a social lens did not require modem 
property scholars to veer away from the primacy of the right to exclude, as it 
was formulated in the earliest years of the new American Republic. Indeed, in 
this regard, modem scholars have been quite consistent with traditional 
property theory, continuing to affirm the right to exclude.61 As Goldstein and 
Thompson argued in 2006, "[T]he cornerstone of private property is the right 
to exclude anyone and anything from your property that you don't want on your 
property."62 Maintaining a focus on the right to exclude may be, indeed, quite 
logical given the history of territorial claims as an instigator of violence. "It 
may be the case that most trespasses are relatively minor offenses . . . . But, all 
the same, ... most wars are fought over territory. Property does matter, as 
centuries of battles, large and small, to defend it show."63 
Modem property theory has, however, often treated the right to exclude as 
insufficient to justify or explain the concept of private property. Adam 
Mossoff, for example, includes the right to exclude within his understanding of 
property but finds that it is "essential but insufficient" for explaining property. 64 
Therefore, while modem property theorists generally are willing to affirm the 
importance of the right to exclude, it is but one component of their theories. 
One significant strain of modem property theory emphasizes the 
intersection between law and economics and property.65 Modem property 
FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON 
GOOD 7 (2003); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF 
PROPERTY 11 (2000); Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: 
Residential Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7 
(1989); Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy, I YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 
7 (1989); Laura S. Underkufller-Freund, Response, Property: A Special Right, 71 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1033, 1034 (1996); Andre J. Van der Walt, Property Rights 
and Hierarchies of Power: A Critical Evaluation of Land Reform Policy in South 
Africa§ 1.4 (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
Id at 1101 n.19. 
61. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1836 (2006) (describing the right to exclude as "foremost among the property 
rights"). 
62. PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., PROPERTY LAW: OWNERSHIP, USE, AND 
CONSERVATION 53 (2006). 
63 . Nicole Stelle Garnett, Property In-Laws, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 279, 287 (2007); 
see also Preface of PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW, supra note 20, at xvii ("Wars and revolutions 
are commonly fought over property rules and property distributions."). 
64. Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 
377 (2003). 
65 . While modem property's social relations approach may seem "soft," the economic 
component adds a layer of irrefutability. Economics, like other sciences, benefits from the air of 
scientific certainty. "Scientific knowledge is politically powerful in part because it seems to exclude 
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theory is consistent with an economic perspective that thinks of pollution as an 
externality.66 While a landowner may profit from a specific land use, that use 
may also generate negative consequences (externalities) for other surrounding 
landowners. 67 
Law and economics then addresses itself to the problem of competing 
interests of private landowners, in particular the two competing rights to 
exclude. One landowner may wish to exclude society from influencing his land 
uses, while the other wishes to exclude the externalities. Such disputes must be 
dealt with through property or tort law. Law and economics provides rationales 
for how such disputes should be resolved. Although the model can be adapted 
to respond to more national and international interests such as climate change, 
scholars have primarily conceived of the model and developed the theory in the 
context of a few neighbors who are all private property owners.68 
Law and economics approaches are also consistent with modern property 
theory in maintaining an emphasis on possession. Modern legal theory has not 
refuted the emphasis on possession and instead acknowledges possession as a 
key component of American property theory.69 Similarly, law and economics 
approaches have favored the rule of first possession, arguing for the rule's 
efficacy in rewarding labor and promoting active use of resources. 70 
There is a certain symmetry behind law and economics approaches and 
modern property theory's embrace of the social relationships approach. For 
example, Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky have proposed a theory of 
property based on the idea of organizing property rules to favor "the value 
inherent in stable ownership."71 While Bell and Parchomovsky's theory makes 
sense based on utilitarian economics, a property system that promotes stable 
ownership is also likely to promote non-violence-at least in its initial setting 
of distribution with land in abundance. Such an understanding is also an 
the arbitrary and subjective. Scientists seem to provide universally valid, impersonal, nonideological 
conclusions, transforming questions of power and politics into the subjects of rational, value-neutral 
inquiry." Joy Rohde, Gray Matters: Social Scientists, Military Patronage, and Democracy in the Cold 
War, 96 J. AM. HIST. 99, 100 (2009). 
66. Doug Rendleman, Rehabilitating the Nuisance Injunction to Protect the Environment, 75 
WASH. &LEEL.REV. 1859, 1877-78(2018). 
67. Id. at 1877. 
68. See J. William Futrell, The Transition to Sustainable Development Law, 21 PACE ENV'T L. 
REV. 179, 193 (2003). 
69. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221, 
1221-22 (1979); Rose, supra note 19, at 73 . 
70. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW§ 3.1, at 36 (5th ed. 1988), reprinted in 
PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW, supra note 20, at 54, 59. 
71. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 6, at 538-39. 
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intuitive one and can be understood in the short-term as an on-the-ground view 
that might have influenced the adoption of private property regimes. 
One of the first modem property theories to focus on the community and 
social relations came from Carol Rose, who also incorporated a law and 
economics perspective in her model. In a 1988 essay, Rose focused on the 
"hard-edged" doctrines that we tend to prefer in property law.72 She 
acknowledged that economics suggest the more important something is, the 
more inclined we are toward hard and fast rules, but she also argued that "[ w ]e 
establish a system of clear entitlements so that we can barter and trade for what 
we want instead of fighting."73 Rose did not explore this idea in depth, 
however, as her primary focus was on the two types of property rules-(1) clear 
or strict and (2) muddy or blurred-and their increasing tendency to move 
toward each other.74 
Ten years later, Rose revisited the issue in the context of discussing 
Blackstone and the origins of claims to private property.75 She noted, 
"Permanent claims allowed the 'occupiers' to avoid conflicts with one another 
and encouraged them to labor on the things to which they now claimed a durable 
right. ... Exclusive dominion is useful because it reduces conflicts and induces 
productive incentives."76 Yet, she moved over the connection to violence 
quickly to focus on the link between established, secure claims and the overall 
generation of wealth or willingness of occupiers to invest in property.77 Indeed, 
she later questioned whether first-possession rules promote or prevent violence, 
suggesting that "[t]he problem is that a first-occupancy principle invites 
everyone to grab at everything, and everyone winds up fighting with everyone 
else."78 As she later argued, "Blackstone's massive doctrinal sections disclosed 
very little to remind readers of the reasons of the self-seeking, possibly violent 
and certainly problematic initial grabs of initial occupancy."79 
In her influential 1994 book, Rose re-examined Locke's approach to first 
possession rules and concluded that what society chose to reward was not so 
much the labor of cultivation but more the labor of "speaking clearly and 
72. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577,577 (1988). 
73. Id. at 578 . 
74. Id. at 580 ("This paper is about the blurring of clear and distinct property rules with the 
muddy doctrines of 'maybe or maybe not,' and about the reverse tendency to try to clear up the blur 
with new crystalline rules ."). 
75 . Rose, supra note 32, at 601. 
76. Id. at 60fr07. 
77. Id. at 607. 
78. Id. at 609. 
79. Id. at 61 I. 
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distinctly about one's claims to property."80 Rose emphasized communication 
because of its economic utility; clear communication about ownership 
minimizes waste and maximizes efficiency in the system.81 Rose's emphasis 
was on the economics. 82 As she said, "Economists have the answer: clear titles 
facilitate trade and minimize resource-wasting conflict."83 Rose implicitly 
favored Bentham's view of property as primarily directed toward wealth and 
prosperity.84 
In looking to the question of what determines possession, Rose explained 
rules of possession in terms of social relationships. She argued, "The clear-act 
principle suggests that the common law defines acts of possession as some kind 
of statement."85 More forcefully, she describes, "Possession as the basis of 
property ownership, then, seems to amount to something like yelling loudly 
enough to all who may be interested."86 
Indeed, by investigating the idea of first possession we can discover some 
truths about the nature of our concept of property,87 but we need not necessarily 
do so by focusing on the value of communication in terms of the economics, 
primarily referencing wealth and investment as Rose did. A more critical 
component, and one Rose briefly mentions, is communication's role in 
preventing violent conflicts. 88 This understanding also dovetails with other 
approaches that focus on the types of labor that create visible changes on the 
land. 
Rose adopted the communication approach because "it correctly draws 
attention to the intensely social nature of property."89 Rose critiqued the 
traditional view of land as seen through the lens of individual rights. Rose 
explained, "In a more sophisticated version of property, of course, we see 
property as a way of defming our relationships with other people."90 Rose 
reasoned, "[A] property regime winds up by satisfying even more desires, 
because it mediates conflicts between individuals and encourages everyone to 




84. Id. at 3. 
85. Id. at 13. 
86. Id. at 16. 
87. See id. at 16-20. 
88. Id. at 16. 
89. Id. at 4. 
90. Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, 
Feminist Theory, reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LA w, supra note 20, at 28, 30. 
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work and trade instead of fighting."91 Rose then emphasized that "Locke's 
major addendum to this picture was to show the relevance of property to the 
desire to live. He pointed out that life depends on property, in a very primitive 
sense; if one cannot literally appropriate those berries and fruits, one will 
simply die."92 For Rose, the link between property and sustenance illustrates 
the social aspects of property law, particularly the construction of ownership 
around scarce resources.93 Overall, Rose's approach joined economics with 
social relations to create a more communal understanding of property rules. 
C. Progressive Property Theory, Modern Property Theory, and Community 
as Social Value 
Progressive property follows modem property law in retaining a central 
focus on the social nature of property.94 Joseph Singer began a recent article 
with a simple statement of this approach: "Property is a social and political 
institution and not merely an individual entitlement."95 If we are to distinguish 
between modem property theory's endorsement of community as a central 
value, the contribution of progressive property theory may be to push that 
community value to the more liberal political persuasion. Ezra Rosser 
describes progressive property theory as taking "on the mantle of a socially 
minded understanding of property."96 Progressive property continues the 
modem focus on social relationships but adds a layer of emphasis on specific 
''underlying human values that property serves."97 With that said, arguably, 
progressive scholars do not, as Ezra Rosser has argued, "have a monopoly on 
thinking that property should serve human values. "98 
Ill. PROPERTY THEORY AS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Environmental regulation in the United States can be divided roughly into 
two eras: (1) an initial period with limited regulation except through common 
law tort and property actions and (2) a later period with centralized 
environmental statutes taking over the key role of regulation. This Part begins 
by explaining why a historical perspective is the appropriate lens needed to 
91. Id. at 31. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 30. 
94. Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 
CALIF. L. REV. 107, 116 (2013). 
95 . Singer, supra note 7, at 1010. 
96. Ezra Rosser, Destabilizing Property, 48 CONN. L. REV. 397, 401-02 (2015). 
97. Alexander, Penalver, Singer & Underkuffier, supra note 8, at 743 . 
98. Rosser, supra note 96, at 401. 
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examine this issue. This Part then discusses those two eras of American 
environmental law and how particular concepts of property theory have 
supported those approaches to environmental regulation. 
To understand how property theory impacts environmental law, this Article 
adopts a historical perspective. Such a perspective is critical for an accurate 
analysis of the law as well as for building theory in the context of the climate 
crisis.99 
Recently, historians have become particularly aware of their lack of a role 
in the work of policy change surrounding the climate crisis. Yet, a role for 
historians in this discussion is critical: "Historical analysis allows us to move 
beyond scientific and technical findings to contextualize them."100 Paul Sabin 
recently examined this problem. He argued "that historical thinking and 
analogies already powerfully influence energy and climate policy-but with 
little participation from historians. Historians have allowed myths that valorize 
99. Our understanding of history and our focus on landscape impacts how we approach 
environmental regulation generally. For example, consider how the German historical view of property 
contrasts with the American perspective: 
Unlike the American wilderness ethic, an ideal that has valued spaces devoid of 
human influence, the Germans' concept of Landschaft envisioned the ideal 
environment in a pastoral sense, as a cultivated garden that blends the natural, 
cultivated, and built environments in an aesthetically harmonious whole. 
Reinforcing this sense of Landschaft as both a cultural and a natural space is the 
political meaning of the world, which refers to a unit of territorial administration, 
such as a province or region. The two meanings of the word were often 
intertwined, so that the visual state of the Landschaft was thought to mirror the 
spiritual condition of the community. The German trajectory of environmental 
preservation also placed the cultural landscapes of home, not the sublime places 
of the distant wilderness, at the center of environmental perception and care. 
THOMAS M. LEKAN, IMAGINING THE NATION IN NATURE: LANDSCAPE PRESERVATION AND GERMAN 
IDENTITY, 1885-1945, at 15 (2004) (footnote omitted). 
In American history, misconceptions of places have prevented action to preserve nature. As 
David Robertson wrote, "Myth often obscures the complex realities of place, and this observation holds 
equally true for locales occupying unfavored perceptual territory. For example, symbols of difficult 
and unwholesome living, impoverished central cities, and isolated rural boondocks are also burdened 
by misperception." DAVID ROBERTSON, HARD AS THE ROCK ITSELF: PLACE AND IDENTITY IN THE 
AMERICAN MINING TOWN I (2006). Robertson explains, "Mining has created a symbolic landscape 
similarly stigmatized. In the popular imagination, mining landscapes-mineral extraction and 
processing areas and the adjacent settlements for mine workers-have become icons of dereliction and 
decay. For those who live in these places, however, these landscapes may function as meaningful 
communities and homes." Id. at 2. As a result, "[t]here exists a long tradition of scholarly and literary 
description equating mining landscapes with dereliction and decay." Id. at 4 . 
I 00. Paul Sabin, The Ultimate Environmental Dilemma: Making a Place for Historians in the 
Climate Change and Energy Debates, in 15 ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 76, 77 (2010). 
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a free market in energy to dominate the public discourse, presenting current 
production and consumption patterns as largely unchangeable."101 
The role of historians is particularly important in understating the history 
of energy usage in the United States as well as the history of regulations that 
have either discouraged or encouraged this use. Sabin argued: 
Historians can help ensure that climate and energy debates 
better reflect a fundamental historical truth-the energy 
system reflects political power and social values as much as 
the latest engineering and science. A greater appreciation for 
that history can enable greater understanding of the potential 
routes to addressing the climate problem.102 
A historical perspective can also illuminate the role of tort decisions in 
establishing and encouraging energy markets. For example: 
Judicial rulings during the oil era often deferred to oil's 
privileged position and importance. As the California 
Supreme Court ruled in a 1928 court case opening the coastline 
to oil drilling, "the development of the mineral resources, of 
which oil and gas are among the most important, is the settled 
policy of state and nation, and the courts should not hamper 
this manifest policy except upon the existence of most practical 
and substantial grounds."103 
There is a similar narrative for coal, showing how the market for coal 
declined as a fuel-when it was being burned in homes for energy-but then 
increased again as an energy source for electricity. These narratives 
emphasized the importance of industrial land uses and stigmatized less invasive 
land uses.104 Notably, there was no lack of awareness of the devastating 
environmental impacts of mining throughout these decades. David Robertson 
has written about this part of mining history. Robertson explains, "Mining has 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 85 (citing Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, 181-82 (Cal. 1928)). 
104. Assuming that development is the best use, and that natural land is not being put to any use, 
a resident manager of a coal company explained: "We just donated 150 acres for a new regional airport, 
and we're open to other ideas. We don't intend to walk off and leave this land to the Indians." John 
Egerton, Boom or Bust in the Hollows of Appalachia, N .Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1981, at 57. This represents 
the majority view at the time, a false dichotomy suggesting that those who are not dominant over nature 
are subjected to it or submissive. See RODGER CUNNINGHAM, APPLES ON THE FLOOD: MINORITY 
DISCOURSE AND APPALACHIA 96 ( 1991 ). It also illustrates the continuing problem of the mentality of 
land that is not developed is not being used-precisely the argument that was used to remove lands 
from Native Americans on the theory that land wasn't "discovered" until a white man found and used 
it. It is again, a cultural view that was enshrined by judicial opinion-Johnson v. M 'lntosh, which 
essentially argued it was a waste to leave land as wilderness. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 590 
(1823). 
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also created some of the country's most environmentally troubled landscapes. 
Few industries have such a profound and visible impact on the environment."105 
Our awareness of these problems began centuries ago: "As early as the 
sixteenth century, mining was recognized as a destructive force in Europe; and 
environmental problems created by mining began to concern the U.S. public in 
the 1880s."106 Additionally, environmental law largely emerged in response to 
the problems created specifically by the mining industry; such regulation was 
desperately needed. 107 "Indeed, mining was among the nation's first industries 
to be regulated on the basis of environmental concerns, and as the industry's 
footprint spread into the nation's diminishing wild lands so did awareness that 
mining severely impaired the quality of land, water, and air."108 Despite the 
development of regulation, however, the level of consumption for key mining 
goods such as coal continued to increase. 109 
This story, however, is not just a story of public consumption. "As these 
coal stories show, executive, legislative, and judicial branches set public energy 
policies together."110 These mining increases were, in part, also fueled by 
specific legal policies, not just in terms of federal and state statutes but also by 
specific judicial decisions. For example, one property decision by the Kentucky 
Supreme Court-a jurisdiction located in the heart of coal country-
revolutionized the ability of coal companies to access mineral reserves and push 
aside the rights of land-owners and neighbors.11 1 The 1987 ruling by the 
Kentucky Supreme Court "reinstated the provisions of the antiquated broad-
form deed, a document that awards virtually all mineral rights claims to coal 
companies and not to landowners."112 
105. ROBERTSON, supra note 99, at 3. 
106. Id. 
107. By 1920, Professor Ronald Eller, a historian, described the transformation of the 
Appalachian landscape: "The once majestic earth was scarred and ugly, and the streams ran brown 
with garbage and acid runoff from the mines. A black dust covered everything. Huge mounds of coal 
and 'gob' piles of discarded mine waste lay about." Patrick C. McGinley, From Pick and Shovel to 
Mountaintop Removal: Environmental Injustice in the Appalachian Coalfields, 34 ENV'T L. 21, 26 
(2004). And this theft of resources continues to threaten Appalachians. Mountaintop mining has 
"stripped their hillsides of vegetation, obliterated streams and drainage patterns and turned the hollow 
into an overflowing funnel every time rain drains off the mining plateau being created above their 
houses." Francis X. Clines, Flooding in Appalachia Stirs Outrage Over a Mining Method, N. Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 12, 2002, at AS. 
108. ROBERTSON, supra note 99, at 3. 
109. See id. at 2-3. 
110. Sabin, supra note 100, at 86. 
111 . Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294, 304-05 (Ky. 1987). 
112. DONALD EDWARD DAVIS, HOMEPLACE GEOGRAPHY: ESSAYS FOR APPALACHIA 21 
(2006). 
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History is critical to developing theory because "[p ]ivotal decisions shaping 
the energy system are found not just under the rubric of 'energy' policy, but 
also as tax policy, regulation, property rights, and public infrastructure. Energy 
intersects with virtually every aspect of our economy and social organization, 
so energy policy often is made in unexpected places."113 Additionally, a 
historical perspective lends depth to an analysis of how new sources of energy 
fare on the market: "Wind energy and other renewable forms of energy continue 
to suffer comparisons based on their relative market price. The political history 
of energy in the United States shows clearly, however, that relative market 
prices reflect past politics as much as current economic factors."114 
A similar argument can be made for the role of not only culture and markets 
but also statutes and judicial decisions in creating an automobile and roads 
focused culture that drove up the consumption of both oil and gasoline within 
the United States. The automobile and roadways of America became "a visual 
symbol of the American dream of individual freedom through mobility."115 
Thus, "an auto- and truck-oriented roadside landscape began to emerge by the 
mid-1920s."116 This focus on the gas-guzzling automobile did not emerge 
simply from a good Ford marketing campaign. Instead, "[t]he single most 
important development occurred in 1956 with the creation of the Federal Aid 
to Highways Act, which established the Interstate Highway System."117 The 
road network changed the market for oil and gas and the American orientation 
toward our landscapes. "The building of the impressive road network across 
the vastness of American space has accomplished more than spatial control; it 
has been a fundamental reordering of the American economy and society."118 
The development of the vast highway network also immunized the American 
public to recognizing and rejecting environmental destruction. "Road cuts 
through hills exposed steep slopes to erosion; highways interrupted traditional 
paths for wildlife; roadside vegetation allowed the introduction of nonnative 
species."119 This created a particular narrative of nature, environment, and the 
113. Sabin, supra note 100, at 86--87. 
114. Id. at 87. 
115. Harvey K. Flad, Country Clutter: Visual Pollution and the Rural Roadscape, 553 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 117, 118 (1997). 
116. Id. at 119. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 120. 
119. Id. 
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proper future of development. Such narratives critically reinforce future 
behaviors. 120 
This is because"[ s ]ocial constructions of nature reveal much about 'not just 
the natural world but the human cultures that lend meaning and moral 
imperatives to that world. "'121 
Additionally, the road network was a significant part of establishing 
favored and disfavored areas of the country-the urban and rural divide that we 
now speak of so easily and naturally as though it were an unforeseen product 
of random human behaviors. 122 That creation of road accessible and 
120. Katrina Schwartz has written about the power of these environmental narratives, examining 
them in the context of post-communism environmental regulation. See KATRINA Z. S. SCHWARTZ, 
NATURE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY AFTER COMMUNISM: GLOBALIZING THE ETHNOSCAPE 1 (2006). 
Schwartz wrote that "each narrative in its heyday commands tremendous influence over perceptions 
of nature and agendas for nature management." Id. at 4 . Schwartz explained, "Scholars in the 
interdisciplinary field of political ecology have shown that those who control environmental narratives 
also wield power over land and natural resources." Id. at 4-5. 
121. Id. at 3 (quoting William Cronon, Introduction: In Search of Nature, in UNCOMMON 
GROUND: RETHINKING THE HUMAN PLACE IN NATURE 23, 26 (William Cronon ed., 1996)). 
122. Cultural perceptions of Appalachians developed to suit this rural-urban divide and to justify 
environmental exploitation of the Appalachian Mountains in pursuit of coal. Appalachians were 
approached by other whites with an "attitude ... of superiority and paternalism." DEBORAH VAN SAU 
MCCAULEY, APPALACHIAN MOUNTAIN RELIGION : A HISTORY 12 (1995). "[O]ther Americans 
needed to see Appalachians as ignorant hillbillies in order not to feel guilty for having plundered our 
timber and coal, wrecked our environment, and exploited our labor. Victors always portray the 
vanquished in unflattering terms in order to rationalize their own brutality." Lisa Alther, Border States, 
in BLOODROOT: REFLECTIONS ON PLACE BY APPALACHIAN WOMEN WRITERS 21, 27 (Joyce Dyer ed., 
1998). Ronald Eller, a key scholar of Appalachian history and sociology wrote that America's image 
of Appalachia is "feuds, . .. stills, mine wars, environmental destruction, joblessness and human 
depredation." Ronald D. Eller, Forward to BACK TALK FROM APPALACHIA: CONFRONTING 
STEREOTYPES 3, 9 (Dwight B. Billings, Gurney Norman & Katherine Ledford eds., 1999). In the 
American cultural norm, Appalachia became "a place where dirty children sat listlessly on the porches 
of old shacks, a place that only existed in black and white." Anne Shelby, The "R" Word: What's So 
Funny (and Not So Funny) About Redneck Jokes, in BACK TALK FROM APPALACHIA: CONFRONTING 
STEREOTYPES, supra, at 153-54. 
Such stereotypes culturally justify a world American and yet not American, a larger culture that 
tolerates "injustice and exploitation .. . monopolization of land by absentee owners, political 
domination, taxation inequalities, poor working conditions and low wages, deindustrialization, 
environmental ruin, and social neglect." Dwight B. Billings, Appalachian Studies and the Sociology 
of Appalachia, in 2 21ST CENTURY SOCIOLOGY: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 390, 394 (Clifton D. 
Bryant & Dennis L. Peck eds., 2007). 
As a result, even scholarship on these areas frequently reflects an extremely negative bias toward 
rural inhabitants. Donald Davis explained one, relatively recent, example of this phenomenon: 
Shelby Lee Adam's book Appalachian Portraits (Oxford: University of 
Mississippi Press, 1993), is no exception .... Adams has given us another 
macabre version of the region and its rural inhabitants. Almost all of his 
116 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [104:93 
inaccessible areas would also support the more environmentally destructive 
energy markets such as those for coal, oil, and natural gas. 123 
The fate of rural roadscapes in the twenty-first century hinges 
on what changes may occur to the "two rural Americas"-the 
rural-urban fringe regions near major metropolitan centers, and 
the more remote, or "deep," rural areas far from regions of 
economic growth and vitality. Planning for either of these two 
rural landscapes will have to consider how to address the 
economic and social forces at work nationally and regionally, 
but an even more comprehensive view will require integrating 
a concern for the natural and cultural landscapes as places to 
live, work, and visit. If the landscape124 mirrors the values of 
photographs-which are admittedly technically and compositionally striking-
border on the grotesque. Adams gives little dignity to his subjects, showing them 
in stereotypical poses, often with blank, mentally incapacitated facial expressions 
and from angles that accentuate their peculiarity and marginality. 
DA VIS, supra note 112, at 97. 
123. There are no removals of goods such as coal, oil, and natural gas without impact. As 
Wendell Berry put it, "The industrial economy thus is inherently violent. It impoverishes one place in 
order to be extravagant in another, true to its colonialist ambition .... Industrialists are always ready 
to ignore, sell, or destroy the past." Wendell Berry, The Agrarian Standard, in THE ESSENTIAL 
AGRARIAN READER: THE FUTURE OF CULTURE, COMMUNITY, AND THE LAND 23, 26 (Norman Wirzba 
ed., 2003). Additionally, these burdens fall more heavily on already disadvantaged populations. In 
addition to raising concerns about exacerbating poverty, the geography of mining, oil, and natural gas 
also places Native American populations at greater risk of taking the brunt of the negative 
environmental consequences of these markets. Daniel Brook argued that the impact is so severe that 
we should, in fact, regard these acts as environmental genocide. "In the modem era, these forms of 
genocide have been superseded by a more insidious, and ultimately more destructive, form. 
Environmental genocide is perpetrated by the U.S. government and by private corporations alike; some 
of their methods are legal, while others are not." Daniel Brook, Environmental Genocide: Native 
Americans and Toxic Waste, 57 AM. J. ECON. SOCIO. 105, 105 (1998). Brook explained, because of 
the low socioeconomic level of Native Americans, "they are most at risk for toxic exposure." Id. The 
link to poverty is obvious: "[D]isadvantages are multiplied by dependence on food supplies closely 
tied to the land in which [toxic] materials ... have been shown to accumulate." Id. (quoting RON 
GLASS, BY OUR OWN LIVES: MOVING THE FOUNDATION STONE OF RACISM (mimeo)). 
Simultaneously, Native American populations find themselves unable to establish control over 
these exploitations of resources, often within their own territorial lands. Sovereignty over reservation 
resources remains limited. John S. Harbison, The Broken Promise Land: An Essay on Native American 
Tribal Sovereignty over Reservation Resources, 14 STAN. ENV'T L.J. 347, 348--49 (1995). 
124. Landscape itself is a contested concept. Kenneth Olwig argued "that much of the confusion 
generated by these diverging approaches can be clarified by re-examining, in historical and 
geographical context, the substantive meaning of landscape as a place of human habitation and 
environmental interaction." Kenneth R. Olwig, Recovering the Substantive Nature of Landscape, 86 
ANNALS Ass'N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 630, 630 (1996). He focused specifically on the concept of 
landscape, which he said "need not be understood as being either territory or scenery; it can also be 
conceived as a nexus of community, justice, nature, and environmental equity, a contested territory 
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that is as pertinent today as it was when the term entered the modern English language at the end of 
the sixteenth century." Id. at 630-31. 
Cosgrove suggested a similar interpretation of landscape. The scholar argued: 
In geographical usage landscape is an imprecise and ambiguous concept whose 
meaning has defied the many attempts to define it with the specificity generally 
expected of a science. While landscape obviously refers to the surface of the 
earth, or a part thereof, and thus to the chosen field of geographical enquiry, it 
incorporates far more than merely the visual and functional arrangement of 
natural and human phenomena which the discipline can identify, classify, map 
and analyse. Landscape shares but extends the meaning of "area" or "region," 
both concepts which have been claimed as its geographical equivalents. As a 
term widely employed in painting and imaginative literature as well as in 
environmental design and planning, landscape carries multiple layers of meaning. 
DENISE. COSGROVE, SOCIAL FORMATION AND SYMBOLIC LANDSCAPE 13 (1984). 
Geographer David Delaney wrote about the social construction of key terms such as nature and 
landscape and the relationship between those constructions and law, as it exists not only in statutes and 
judicial opinions but also in cultural norms. In a seminal article on the topic, Delaney explained: 
The primary objective of this article is to engage and extend the discussion within 
geography on the social production or construction of nature through an 
exploration of a particular and highly significant set of practices-those 
associated with legal argument-through which such constructions are attempted 
and provisionally accomplished. This article also extends the range of material 
sites that are the objects of production beyond those usually treated by 
geographers. I aim to examine episodes, not only in the social construction of 
landscapes, but also of animals, human bodies, and "mind." 
David Delaney, Making Nature/Marking Humans: Law as a Site of (Cultural) Production, 91 ANNALS 
Ass'N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 487,487 (2001). Delaney argued, "Nature .. . is produced in a number of 
cultural domains .. . . The representations and images that are crafted and put into circulation have 
material consequences." Id. at 488 (citing BRUCE BRAUN & NOEL CASTREE, REMAKING REALITY: 
NATURE AT THE MILLENNIUM ( 1998) ). According to Delaney, "As ideological fragments or elements 
of consciousness, they inform actions. They are part of seeing the material and social world in 
particular ways and not others. They provide the basis for justification and critique, for business-as-
usual and resistance." Id. at 488. As a result, "like these other discourses, law may have a tendency 
to read nature in light of a set of peculiar or local anxieties and concerns. The very idea of (modern, 
liberal) law can be seen to be reliant on a particular conception of humanness." Id. (citing Andrew E. 
Lelling, Comment, Eliminative Materialism, Neuroscience, and the Criminal Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 
1471 (1993); John Lawrence Hill, Law and the Concept of the Core Self: Toward a Reconciliation of 
Naturalism and Humanism, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 289 (1997)). Delaney argued, "To the extent that 
modem understandings of what it is to be human are dependent on particular conceptions of nature, it 
is reasonable to suggest that legal discourse cannot be 'neutral' with respect to competing conceptions 
of nature." Id. at 488. Therefore, "legal texts are significant artifacts through which we can glimpse 
how conceptions of nature are contested, validated, repudiated, modified, and-more importantly-
deployed by situated actors in countless ways." Id. at 489. Law's rule is key: "Attention to law 
sharpens our awareness that control over the word, over meaning, over the terms of categorical 
inclusion and exclusion, is strongly conducive to--ifnot determinative of---control over segments of 
the material world that are given meaning by reference to categories." Id. Delaney explains: 
To speak of law as "a site of cultural production or political contestation" is, of 
course, shorthand for indicating the social projects and practices wherein nature 
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a culture, then policies and implementation strategies that 
focus on the aesthetics of transportation are surely significant 
factors toward enhancing a higher quality of life.125 
[104:93 
If landscapes mirror social values, then rural America became the place that 
citizens were happy to sacrifice to the markets for coal, oil, and natural gas. 
This was not an accident but rather a foreseeable result of federal practices that 
spent money on building the highway infrastructure and, simultaneously, 
rejected other, more sustainable alternatives. 
The critical insight from history then is the degree to which legal 
mechanisms shape our energy markets, not just through regulation but also 
through our interpretation of common law claims within tort, property, and 
other fields. 126 Sabin explained, "One of the most important lessons from the 
nation's oil history, then, is that there never has been a free market in energy. 
Frankly, there never could be. Public choices inevitably shape the energy sector 
through tax policy, property rights, labor law, and many other unavoidable 
decisions."127 
and its surrogates and opposites are deployed in efforts to enlist the power of the 
state to validate some versions in preference to other competing versions. The 
question, then, is not what is nature, but what work does "nature" do in instances 
oflegal rhetoric? 
Id. at 490. In legal discourse, "Nature as a trope may signify, among other things, negativity, absence, 
necessity, the determined, timelessness or pastness, order or disorder, wildness, essence, permanence, 
and universality." Id. 
125. Flad, supra note 115, at 128-29 (footnotes omitted). 
126. Notably, without history, we may also misjudge some legal institutions and infer a more 
ecologically favorable outcome or intent than, in fact, ever existed. A great example of this is the forest 
laws of England: 
A "forest" in the Middle Ages meant something quite different from how we think 
of it today: It mainly existed for our medieval forbears as a legal entity, rather 
than as an economic or ecological one. Therefore, a forest could actually include 
treeless fields of arable or pasture if these came within the purview of property 
rights and laws that defined it as such, according to the customs and traditions of 
the locality. 
JOHN ABER TH, AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE AGES: THE CRUCIBLE OF NATURE 87 
(2013). Aberth explained, "The Weald, one of the largest blocks of uncleared woodland in Anglo-
Saxon England, was nonetheless from the eighth century heavily exploited as woodland pasture, 
mainly for pigs, a fact that is known from royal charters granted to ecclesiastical institutions for the 
right of pannage." Id. at 88. "[I]t is quite evident that the main concern of crown policy was to exploit 
the forest law for its revenue-raising potential and not necessarily for the sake of the best interests of 
the woods themselves." Id. at 115. 
127. Sabin, supra note 100, at 84. 
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With an emphasis on possession and exclusion, traditional property law 
supported the centuries of law without statutory environmental regulation. 128 
During these years, the only source of environmental regulation was generally 
property-tort claims such as trespass and nuisance. 129 Both trespass and 
nuisance were uniquely situated for the task of bringing about environmental 
regulation within an era when there is almost complete focus on the individual 
as the center of property rights and very little sense of the social context for 
those rights. In such a context, trespass and nuisance could act as limits on land 
use precisely because suits were brought by neighboring, injured landowners. 
In other words, the environmental regulation did not come from a centralized 
source, vindicating rights for the general public, but instead from a similarly 
situated private owner of land. Nuisance and trespass provided a way of 
controlling one particularly badly-behaved neighbor. 
Nuisance and trespass, of course, came with their limitations. Neither 
effectuated a system of zoning, which would limit problematic land uses from 
ever beginning, but instead the two causes of action worked as fixes to existing 
problems. Each came with its own doctrinal limitations, including statutes of 
limitation,130 rules on entry,131 and limited recognition of pollution as an injury 
without demonstrating physical harm. 132 
Although a few environmental statutes predate the environmental 
movement of the 1960s, the bulk of environmental regulation went into place 
within this era. 133 Key statutory frameworks began to address water pollution, 
air pollution, toxins, workplace safety, and other key issues. 134 Additionally, 
128. In this time period, scholars tended to think less actively about the natural world, 
particularly as a force with the power to shape our life experience. "In writing human history, scholars 
have largely over-looked the role that nature has played in shaping American life and culture. Their 
arrogance in exaggerating differences between humans and other organisms, between human history 
and the natural environment, has created an enormous intellectual gap in our present understanding of 
the human condition." DONALD EDWARD DAVIS, WHERE THERE ARE MOUNTAINS: AN 
ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE SOUTHERN APPALACHIANS 201 (2000). 
129. Mark Latham, Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, The Intersection of Tort and 
Environmental Law: Where the Twains Should Meet and Depart, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 737, 737 
(2011) ("Tort law has historically provided the principal mechanism for remedying harms to the 
environment."). 
130. See Osborne M . Reynolds Jr., Distinguishing Trespass and Nuisance: A Journey Through 
a Shifting Borderland, 44 OKLA. L. REV. 227,244 (1991). 
131. Id. at 235-43. 
132. See, e.g., John P. S. McLaren, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution-Some Lessons 
from Social History, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 155, 157 (1983). 
133. See Sarah T. Phillips, Environmental History, in AMERICAN HISTORY NOW 285 , 306 (Eric 
Foner & Lisa McGirr eds., 2011 ). 
134. Id. 
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zoning became more and more common at the city and county level, which 
served to move less favorable land uses to areas of towns away from housing. 135 
Such more intense regulation of land use was not entirely consistent with 
the earlier understanding of property, which had emphasized the individual as 
the sole party in control of the use of private property. By refocusing property 
away from the individual's rights and toward the idea of property as a set of 
social relationships, property theory supported the development of a more 
extensive set of environmental regulations. Focusing on social relationships 
allowed property rights to be rearticulated as contingent on greater social goods 
such as air and water quality. 
IV. THE FAILURE OF PROGRESSIVE AND MODERN PROPERTY THEORY FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE EROSION OF TORTS FOR ENVIRONMENT AL 
PROBLEMS 
A. Why Torts Matter in the Era of Statutory Environmental Regulation 
Federal and state environmental statutes changed the property-
environmental law relationship substantially. In doing so, however, the statutes 
did not entirely erode the role of tort claims such as nuisance and trespass. 
Those basic common law claims continue to play an important role in 
maintaining environmental protections. 
Some scholars have argued for a narrower role for torts in the context of 
environmental issues. 136 More commonly, scholars have seen tort claims as 
continuing to play a substantial role in environmental regulation. David 
Westbrook, for example, cites tort claims as one of the three central components 
of environmental law. Westbrook explains, "Environmental law is organized 
around three fundamental approaches to environmental problems: (i) common 
law actions (tort, particularly nuisance); (ii) the governmental aggregation of 
externalities whose harms are valued below the costs of their contractual 
resolution or judicial prosecution (administration); and (iii) the establishment 
of markets in order to achieve societal ends ( constructed markets, such as those 
envisaged by the Clean Air Act)."137 There are a number of reasons scholars 
continue to see torts as a key part of environmental regulation. As Lynda 
135. See John Mangin, The New Exclusionary Zoning, 25 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 91, 91-92, 
99-100 (2014). 
136. Latham, Schwartz & Appel, supra note 129, at 773 (concluding that the line between torts 
and environmental law should be narrowly drawn and that "[w]here there is overlap, traditional tort 
law principles, as outlined in this Article, can result in statutory and common law working in 
harmony"). 
137. David A. Westbrook, Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 619, 
621 (1994). 
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Collins has observed, "First, notwithstanding its size and clout, statutory 
environmental law sometimes proves inadequate" and in some cases "tort may 
be the only means to provide redress to injured victims and deter environmental 
wrongdoing. Second, even where a strong regulatory regime exists, tort's 
unique characteristics enable it to supplement, and in some cases even 
outperform, statutory environmental law."138 
That said, nuisance law is not the heart of environmental law. Yet, a better 
understanding of nuisance law can help us understand the relationship between 
property and environmental law. It might have been, but for the reasons 
detailed in the remainder of this Part, nuisance law is being eroded. It is less 
powerful than it used to be for multiple reasons. One of these-which I will 
address later-stems from the more community focused view of property. The 
other-which I will address here-emerges from the odd situation of nuisance 
at the boundary between property and tort law. Two critical transformations 
have happened in nuisance law in recent decades. If nuisance law does indeed 
have an important role to play in environmental law, these transformations 
matter especially because they may make nuisance law less able to address 
environmental concerns effectively. First, social utility moved from being a 
discretionary injunction factor to a part of the basic case for public and private 
nuisance. This removed remedies for many plaintiffs and made the prima facie 
case much more difficult to prove. Second, the Restatement of Torts has pushed 
various claims at the property-tort line (like nuisance and premises liability) 
more toward torts and less property. 139 The outcome of this push is less strict 
liability, more negligence. I have previously criticized the rise of the tort view 
of nuisance-meaning that proving a claim would require proving negligent 
behavior.140 This stands out in sharp contrast to the property view of nuisance, 
which focuses not on the behavior that caused the problem but on the impacts 
to the neighboring property. In such a model, intent is not particularly 
important, but land values are. The odd placement of nuisance at the 
intersection of tort and property has befuddled scholars for years. 
Tort and property form two of the largest and most central fields of law, 
and yet we remain unable to define with precision the outlines and foundations 
138. Lynda M. Collins, Strange Bedfellows? The Precautionary Principle and Toxic Tort: A Tort 
Paradigm for the 21st Century, 35 ENV'TL. REP. NEWS &ANALYSIS 10361, 10362 (2005). 
139. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 343,822 (AM. LAW INST. 1965, 1979). 
140. Jill M. Fraley, Liability for Unintentional Nuisances: How the Restatement of Torts 
Almost Negligently Killed the Right to Exclude in Property Law, 121 W. VA. L. REV. 419,458 
(2018). 
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of either concept. 141 Henry Smith describes our impatience with this situation, 
finding that "[m]ost of us have a sense that property is doing something 
important, but it does it in a somewhat mysterious way."142 Approaching the 
question from the torts perspective, Nicholas McBride finds that "[t]he vast 
amount of academic writing on the nature and basis of tort law that has been 
produced in the last few decades is . .. a sign of sickness," indicating that we 
are incapable of understanding tort law. 143 Indeed, McBride concludes that, by 
the early 1990s, "the community of tort academics was stuck firmly in the 
wildemess."144 If we were lost by the mid-1990s, recent encounters with 
climate change have only revealed how much we struggle with central concepts 
such as harm, causation, and responsibility in tort. 145 Having failed to define 
either property or tort to our satisfaction, we struggle all the more when we try 
to articulate their boundaries. 
Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed proposed demarcating this 
boundary by distinguishing between property and liability rules. 146 Their 
seminal article on the subject focused on how entitlements change hands, 
explaining how the level of protection received by the entitlement depends on 
whether property or liability rules are applied.147 If an entitlement is protected 
by a property rule, it will change hands only through consent of the owner. 148 
If an entitlement is only protected by a liability rule, then it can be taken without 
the owner's consent, so long as a collectively set price is paid to the owner. 149 
Calabresi and Melamed then elaborated circumstances that would encourage 
choosing one set of rules over the other, focusing on an economic perspective, 
which prioritizes the efficiency of exchanges. 150 
Thus, when it came to elaborating the property-tort divide, Calabresi and 
Melamed's scheme focused on the remedies, or "the manner in which 
entitlements are protected," as a primary point of distinction between property 
141. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1105 (1972)(illuminating first 
the intertwined problems of defining property and tort). Calabresi and Melamed note that prior to their 
article, property and torts were very rarely approached from any unified perspective. Id. 
142. Henry E . Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in 
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 959 (2009). 
143. Nicholas J. McBride, Rights and the Basis of Tort Law, in RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAW 331, 
333 (Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson eds., 2012). 
144. Id. 
145. Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do about Tort Law, 41 ENV'T L. 1, I (2011). 




150. Id. at 1106-07. 
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rules and tort rules. 151 Property remedies (i.e. injunctions and supra-
compensatory remedies) made taking the entitlement effectively impossible or 
set the remedy so high that taking would be illogical. 152 Such remedies 
emphasized the quintessential property characteristic of the owner's right to 
exclude. On the other hand, liability rules allowed for violation of the owner's 
right to exclude. Remedies did not punish so much as set compensation at a 
collectively determined price. As a result, liability rules provided some relief 
against the "holdout" problem of a single owner refusing to sell and preventing 
a larger socially valued project from proceeding.153 Liability rules would be 
less attractive than property rules due to the procedural costs but would allow 
for non-consensual takings. The two rules then align with the basic setup of 
property rules as focused on protecting entitlements and allowing takings only 
in the narrowest of circumstances and tort rules as focused on compensating 
when a taking has occurred accidentally or must occur to facilitate another 
social good. 
Calabresi and Melamed's article has remained a central point of discussion 
since publication.154 Yet, scholars have never been comfortable accepting that 
the property versus liability rules framework fully and accurately articulates the 
property-tort divide. Richard Epstein concludes that Calabresi and Melamed 
failed to point us in any direction for systematically determining when property 
or liability rules should prevail. 155 Lee Anne Fennell argues that a failure to 
distinguish between risk and harm in applying Calabresi and Melamed's 
framework leads scholars to distort our understanding of the relationship 
between property and torts. 156 This past year, Calabresi again highlighted this 
issue by tackling the problem of the "resurgence of torts viewed as a purely 
private legal arrangement," and arguing for a "public meaning" of torts via 
liability rules that are collectively set. 157 
151. Id at 1092. 
152. See id at 1106--08. 
153. See id at 1107-09. 
154. See generally Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 
YALE L.J. 1335 (1986); Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability 
and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1993); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property 
Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N .Y.U. L. REV. 440 (1995); Louis 
Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. 
L. REV. 713 (1996); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719 (2004). 
155. Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 
YALE L.J. 2091, 2092 (1997). 
156. Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116 YALE L.J. 1400, 1400 (2007). 
157. Guido Calabresi, A Broader View of the Cathedral: The Significance of the Liability Rule, 
Correcting a Misapprehension, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 4 (2014). For a taxonomy of the private 
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At the moment, progress in elaborating the property-tort divide does not 
look particularly promising. A recent focus in property theory on the 
relationship between property and morality has deemphasized the problem of 
the property-tort divide. When elaborating a theory of property and morality, 
Merrill and Smith argue that the relationship between the two had been 
obscured in scholarship. 158 One of the reasons the authors cite is the law and 
economics approaches that have blossomed since Calabresi and Melamed's 
article. 159 Another factor may be that articles following their lead have focused 
much more on liability rules than on property rules, and therefore have been 
less conscious about articulating the implications of their arguments for the 
property-tort divide. 160 
The property-tort divide matters particularly within the context of this 
Article. If we begin with the basic premise that property theory informs and 
provides a foundation for law itself, both in common law and statutory forms, 
then to the degree that judges and scholars think of nuisance as a tort claim 
rather than a property claim, they may be more likely to think in terms of central 
torts concepts such as harm and negligence rather than in terms of property 
theory concepts such as possession and exclusion. It is only by making sure 
that property retains its claim on nuisance law that we can ensure that property 
theory is critically effective as an instrument of change. 
B. Courts Integrate Community with Social Utility 
Social utility is a legal concept introduced within the nineteenth century to 
address the social benefits of an action that may otherwise be actionable. 
Specifically, social utility described the positive externalities or aspects of an 
action or land use that had significant negative externalities. Social utility is 
particularly important when thinking about property theory because social 
utility is a concept rooted in social relations. 
Courts worked out their concepts of social utility within the context of 
nuisance cases. For example, in York v. Stallings, 161 the court said that 
"[a]lthough [it] found that the fallout of sawdust and cinders on plaintiffs 
premises and the noise at night entitled plaintiff to some relief," against the 
or individual rights views of property, see Lynda L. Butler, The Resilience of Property, 55 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 847, 856-63 (2013). 
158. Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 1849. 
159. Id. 
160. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Reconceptualizing Trespass, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 
1823, 1828-29 (2009) (describing the influence of liability rules via damage awards); Calabresi & 
Melamed, supra note 141, at 1105; George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. 
L. REV. 537 (1972). 
161. York v. Stallings, 341 P.2d 529 (Or. 1959). 
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operation of defendant's lumber mill, "it [did] not follow that an injunction 
should issue as a matter of course," because the "court may refuse an injunction 
in certain cases where the hardship caused to the defendant by the injunction 
would greatly outweigh the benefit resulting to the plaintiff."162 The court 
found evidence of the fallout but could not determine sufficiently its amount 
and frequency.163 The court adopted the Restatement of Torts position that 
embraced considering hardship to the defendant when granting injunctions. 164 
Similarly, in Storey v. Central Hide & Rendering Co., 165 the court faced the 
problem of how to balance the equities in the context of a nuisance action. The 
court reasoned: 
According to the doctrine of "comparative injury" or 
"balancing of equities" the court will consider the injury which 
may result to the defendant and the public by granting the 
injunction as well as the injury to be sustained by the 
complainant if the writ be denied. If the court finds that the 
injury to the complainant is slight in comparison to the injury 
caused the defendant and the public by enjoining the nuisance, 
relief will ordinarily be refused. It has been pointed out that 
the cases in which a nuisance is permitted to exist under this 
doctrine are based on the stem rule of necessity rather than on 
the right of the author of the nuisance to work a hurt, or injury 
to his neighbor. The necessity of others may compel the 
injured party to seek relief by way of an action at law for 
damages rather than by a suit in equity to abate the nuisance. 166 
As a result, the court stated: 
Some one must suffer these inconveniences rather than that the 
public interest should suffer .... These conflicting interests 
call for a solution of the question by the application of the 
broad principles of right and justice, leaving the individual to 
his remedy by compensation and maintaining the public 
interests intact; this works hardships on the individual, but they 
are incident to civilization with its physical developments, 
demanding more and more the means of rapid transportation of 
persons and property. 167 
A nineteenth century Alabama case provides a bit of contrast. In Clifton 
Iron Co. v. Dye, the court reversed injunctive relief in favor of an adjoining 
162. Id. at 534. 
163. Id. at 532. 
164. Id. at 534. 
165. Storey v. Central Hide & Rendering Co., 226 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. 1950). 
166. Id. at 618-19. 
167. Id. at 619. 
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landowner for the pollution of his stream by iron ore washing operations.168 
The injunction was improper because the lower court should have taken notice 
of the very large investments in mining, which necessarily involves washing of 
ores, and therefore sediment flowing into streams. 169 The court recognized the 
injury to the landowner via sediment pollution, and his right to damages, but 
concluded that an injunction decision must take into account the public 
interest. 170 
J.n. Johnson v. Independent School District., 171 the court addressed a septic 
tank. Recognizing that defendant school district's septic tank constituted a 
nuisance as to an adjoining landowner upon whose land the overflow was 
passed, the court said that the general rule, as supported by the weight of 
authorities, seemed to be that "when the issuance of an injunction [ would] cause 
serious public inconvenience or loss without a correspondingly great advantage 
to the complainant no injunction [ would] be granted. "172 "Injunctions are never 
granted," said the court, "when they are against good conscience, or productive 
of hardship, oppression, injustice or public or private mischief."173 The court 
continued: 
It seems to be well established that whenever an injunction is 
asked of a court of equity in cases of this nature . .. [ the court] 
must take into consideration not only the dry, strict rights of 
the plaintiff and defendant, but must have regard to the 
surrounding circumstances-to the rights and interests of other 
persons which may be more or less involved, which, in the 
instant case, would be every citizen of the defendant school 
district. 174 
J.n. Heppenstall Co. v. Berkshire Chemical Co., 175 the court addressed a 
castor bean processing facility. While the defendant's processing of castor 
beans was found to constitute a nuisance, the court nevertheless refused to grant 
an adjoining factory owner injunctive relief, noting that both castor oil and 
nitrogen were 
[H]ighly essential in modem war; that the defendant's plant 
[was] one of three such plants in the United States and [was] 
under army supervision as to the production of the oil; that the 
168. Clifton Iron Co. v. Dye, 6 So. 192, 193 (Ala. 1889). 
169. Id 
170. Id 
171. Johnson v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 199 S.W.2d 421 (Mo. Ct. App. 1947). 
172. Id at 424. 
173. Id (citing Johnson v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 127 S.W. 63 (Mo. 1910)). 
174. Id 
175. Heppenstall Co. v. Berkshire Chem. Co., 35 A.2d 845 (Conn. 1944). 
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defendant [had] exhausted every means to lessen the 
emanation of the dust from its plant; that it [had] removed its 
machinery for grinding the castor bean[s]; that the only further 
means to prevent the dust [was] to stop the processing of the 
bean[s]; and that it would require six months to a year to 
remove the plant to another location .. . and would entail 
considerable expense. 176 
127 
The West Virginia Supreme Court addressed social utility in 1940. In 
Board of Commissioners. v. Elm Grove Mining Co., 177 the court ruled on a 
mining nuisance case. Enjoining as a public nuisance certain activities of a 
mining company with respect to its maintenance of a burning pile of refuse 
materials taken from the mine, the court said that "[ e ]ven in as useful and 
important an industry as the mining of coal, an incidental consequence, such as 
here involved, cannot be justified or permitted unqualifiedly, if the health of the 
public [were] impaired thereby."178 The court said that "[n]otwithstanding a 
business [is] conducted in [a] regular manner, yet if in the operation thereof it 
is shown by facts and circumstances to constitute a nuisance affecting public 
health 'no measure of necessity, usefulness or public benefit will protect it from 
the unflinching condemnation of the law."'179 The court continued that the 
comparative injury doctrine should be applied with great caution in nuisance 
cases, even though not involving public health; "[ w ]ith all the more reason," 
said the court, "there is [an] extremely narrow basis for undertaking to balance 
conveniences where people's health is involved."180 
Such cases as these provided the context for adopting the social utility 
concept in other areas of law. This spread began in the mid-twentieth century 
but is accelerating in recent years. 
C. The Spread of Social Utility through the Tort Causes of Action 
Social utility initially informed the court's analysis of the equities when 
determining whether to grant an injunction in a nuisance case. Unsurprisingly, 
most of the cases addressing social utility were land use cases where the land 
use at issue produced pollution, but also other community goods such as jobs 
and tax dollars. The use of social utility analysis has expanded significantly 
within the context of nuisance claims. Notably, however, social utility has 
spread throughout tort claims more generally. This Section tracks the 
176. Idat847. 
177. Bd. ofComm'rs v. Elm Grove Mining Co., 9 S.E.2d 813 (W. Va. 1940). 
178. Id at 817. 
179. Id (quoting H .G . WOOD,APRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF N UISANCES 41 (3d. ed. 
1893)). 
180. Id 
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continuing expansion of social utility analysis throughout a variety of tort 
claims. 
i. Premises Liability 
For premises liability, the court considers social utility when determining 
whether a condition is unreasonably dangerous. This risk-utility balancing test 
includes four factors: (1) the utility of the things; (2) the likelihood and 
magnitude of the harm, which includes the obviousness and apparentness of the 
condition; (3) the cost of preventing the harm; and (4) the nature of the 
plaintiffs activities in terms of its social utility or whether it is dangerous by 
nature. Other courts do a balancing: decide whether the social value and utility 
of the hazard outweigh, and thus justify its potential harm to others. 
The first reported cases using social utility as a legal concept when 
evaluating the claim began in the 1970s.181 Notably, use of the concept was 
sporadic for decades but has been rising in reported cases since approximately 
2010. 
Louisiana has applied social utility to two recent premises liability cases. 
In Pryor v. Iberia Parish School Board, the plaintiff brought a premises liability 
action against the school board for damages suffered as result of a fall on 
bleachers at stadium owned by board. 182 The court described the test for 
premises liability saying, "In determining whether a defect presents an 
unreasonable risk of harm, the trier of fact must balance the gravity and risk of 
harm against the individual and societal rights and obligations, the social utility, 
and the cost and feasibility ofrepair."183 Additionally, the court explained that 
social utility was a part of the relevant balancing test: 
In determining whether a condition is unreasonably dangerous, 
courts have adopted a risk-utility balancing test. This test 
encompasses four factors: (1) the utility of the thing[s]; (2) the 
likelihood and magnitude of harm, which includes the 
obviousness and apparentness of the condition; (3) the cost of 
preventing the harm; and (4) the nature of the plaintiffs 
activities in terms of its social utility, or whether it is dangerous 
by nature. 184 
Notably, the court cited a lack of clarity on how social utility factored into 
the test for premises liability: "Our jurisprudence has not been entirely 
181. See Furrer v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 466 P.2d 605 (Or. 1970) (applying social utility within 
the context of a property damage claim). 
182. See Pryor v. Iberia Par. Sch. Bd., 60 So. 3d 594 (La. 2011). 
183. Id. at 596. 
184. Id. at 597. 
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consistent on this point."185 There is language in Reed v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
suggesting the "trier of fact must decide whether the social value and utility of 
the hazard outweigh, and thus justify, its potential harm to others."186 However, 
other decisions focused on the social utility of the thing as a whole, 
notwithstanding the presence of the defect. 187 
After establishing the test, the court applied the test to the facts of the case, 
which involved the injury on the bleachers. 188 The court found: 
For purposes of the first factor, it is undisputed that the 
bleachers serve a social utility purpose by providing seating for 
patrons of the stadium. However, in a brief to this court, 
plaintiff argues we should focus on the hazard which caused 
her injury-the eighteen-inch gap between the first and second 
seat-which she claims provides no social utility.189 
The second Louisiana case is Dowdy v. City of Monroe.190 In Dowdy, the 
court explained: 
There is no fixed rule for determining whether the thing 
presents an unreasonable risk of harm. The trier of fact must 
balance the gravity and risk of harm against the individual and 
societal rights and obligations, the social utility, and the cost 
and feasibility of repair. Simply put, the trier of fact must 
decide whether the social value and utility of the hazard 
outweigh, and thus justify its potential harm to others.191 
The court further reasoned: 
In determining the reasonableness of a risk, the court must 
consider the broad range of social, economic and moral factors 
and the social utility of the plaintiffs conduct at the time of the 
accident. ... One cannot be protected from all risks. The court 
185. Id. 
186. Reed v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 708 So. 2d 362,365 (La. 1998) (citing W. PAGE KEETON, 
DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 31 (5th ed. 1984)). 
187. See Dauzat v. Curnest Guillot Logging, Inc., 995 So. 2d 1184, 1187 (La. 2008) ("[I]t is 
undisputed that the logging road has a strong social utility for purposes of the first factor, as it is the 
only method for removing harvested timber from Lake Pearl's land."); Boyle v. Bd. of Supervisors, 
La. State Univ., 685 So. 2d 1080, 1083 (La. 1997) ("The utility of sidewalks on university campuses 
is clear as pointed out by the court of appeal."); Pitre v. La. Tech Univ., 673 So. 2d 585,591 (La. 1996) 
("We begin our analysis by examining the utility of the light pole."). 
188. Pryor, 60 So. 3d at 596. 
189. Id. at 597. 
190. Dowdy v. City of Monroe, 78 So. 3d 791 (La. Ct. App. 2011). 
191. Id. at 794-95 (citing Reed, 708 So. 2d 362). 
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must decide what risks are unreasonable. 192 
ii. Negligence 
From the 1990s forward a number of cases include social utility as a part of 
a negligence analysis. The trier of fact must balance the gravity and risk of 
harm against the individual and societal rights and obligations, the social utility, 
and the cost and feasibility of repair. 
In Althaus v. Cohen, 193 the court addressed the duty of care in the context 
of health. With respect to the appropriate rule to apply, the court held: 
The determination of whether a duty exists in a particular case 
involves the weighing of several discrete factors which 
include: (1) the relationship between the parties; (2) the social 
utility of the actor's conduct; (3) the nature of the risk imposed 
and foreseeability of the harm incurred; ( 4) the consequences 
of imposing a duty upon the actor; and ( 5) the overall public 
interest in the proposed solution. 194 
The court found that a trier of fact "must weigh the social utility of Dr. 
Cohen's actions against the nature of the risk and foreseeability ofharm."195 In 
this particular context, the court noted the need for the particular treatment 
provided by the practice.196 The court observed that "[t]he need for prevention 
of child abuse is unquestionable, as is the importance of adequate psychological 
treatment for children who have been sexually abused."197 Similarly, the court 
noted, "[T]herapists who treat sexually abused children perform a valuable and 
useful activity to society."198 When thinking in terms of social utility, the court 
found that "social utility disfavors expanding therapists' duty of care to non-
patients, especially where the non-patients are the accused victimizers. 
However, we must also weigh this factor against the potential risk and 
foreseeability of harm stemming from improper treatment for children who 
have been sexually abused."199 The court ultimately concluded: "[A]fter 
weighing the social utility of effective therapeutic treatment for the child 
192. Id at 795 (citing Graves v. Page, 703 So. 2d 566 (La. 1997); Oster v. Dep't ofTransp. & 
Dev., 582 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1991)). 
193. Althaus v. Cohen, 756 A.2d 1166 (Pa. 2000). 
194. Id at 1169; see also Bird v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d 767, 769 (Tex. 1994) ("In determining 
whether to impose a duty, this Court must consider the risk, foreseeability, and likelihood of injury 
weighed against the social utility of the actor's conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding 
against the injury and the consequences of placing that burden on the actor."). 
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against the nature and foreseeability of the harm, we find that these factors 
weigh against imposing a duty of care to non-patients upon a therapist who 
treats sexually abused children."200 
Beckham v. Jungle Gym, L.L.C.,201 similarly applies social utility in the 
context of negligence. Beckham was a slip and fall negligence case.202 In 
beginning the analysis, the court noted their predicament: "There [was] no fixed 
rule for determining whether the thing presents an unreasonable risk of 
harm. "203 Instead, the "trier of fact must balance the gravity and risk of harm 
against the individual and societal rights and obligations, the social utility, and 
the cost and feasibility ofrepair."204 Additionally, the "trier of fact must decide 
whether the social value and utility of the hazard outweigh, and thus justify its 
potential harm to others."205 The court further noted: 
With the "mixed questions of law and fact" present for the 
examination for an unreasonable risk of harm, the legal side of 
that inquiry suggests that unpaved parking lots are expected to 
have variations and irregularities in their surfaces in providing 
social utility in many settings. From the factual side of the 
inquiry, however, a particular irregularity might be weighed by 
the trier-of-fact and found out of the ordinary so that a person 
might experience an unsuspected change in surface causing a 
fall. Thus, while loose gravel might be expected to be a feature 
that would seldom, if ever, present an unreasonable risk of 
harm, larger materials included on the surface mifht be less 
stable, posing an unsuspected trip or slip hazard."20 
In this particular case, the court ultimately concluded: 
The mixed question of law and fact there required facts to be 
weighed, allowing for the possibility of differing fact 
assessments and a genuine issue of material fact. While a 
gravel parking lot is generally better understood and its social 
utility clearly known, the particular facts of this parking lot will 
in our opinion be better assessed at a trial on the merits for the 
determination of whether an unreasonable risk of harm was 
present. 207 
200. Id 
201. Beckham v. Jungle Gym, L.L.C., 37 So. 3d 564 (La. Ct. App. 2010). 
202. Id at 566. 
203 . Id at 568. 
204. Id 
205 . Id (citing Reed v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 708 So. 2d 362 (La. 1998)). 
206. Id at 569. 
207. Id 
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Williams v. Jones208 involved, again, a fall and a claim of negligence. The 
court began by observing that the Louisiana Supreme Court has explained the 
following (in another case-the Reed case cited in this footnote): 
The unreasonable risk of harm criterion entails a myriad of 
considerations and cannot be applied mechanically .... The 
concept, which requires a balancing of the risk and utility of 
the condition, is not a simple rule of law which can be applied 
mechanically to the facts of the case .. . . Because of the 
plethora of factual questions and other considerations 
involved, the issue necessarily must be resolved on a case-by-
case basis. 209 
Here, the court concluded: 
The fact an accident occurred because of a defect does not 
elevate the condition of the thing to that of an unreasonably 
dangerous defect. The defect must be of such a nature as to 
constitute a dangerous condition that would be reasonably 
expected to cause injury to a prudent person using ordinary 
care under the circumstances.210 
iii. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
From the 1980s forward, some cases include social utility as a part of the 
analysis of claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Mallozzi 
v. Philadelphia Daily Newspapers, Inc.,211 the court examined a newspaper's 
social utility. The court concluded that "[i]n holding that reasonable minds 
could not find defendants' conduct sufficiently outrageous, the court should 
consider the social utility of newspaper reporting."212 
Similarly, in Lucas v. Firine,213 a Connecticut Superior Court found that 
"[l]iability exists only 'for conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by 
decent society, of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does 
208. Williams v. Jones, 34 So. 3d 926 (La. Ct. App. 2010). 
209. Id. at 931 (quoting Reed, 708 So. 2d at 364). 
210. Id. (citing Lasyone v. Kansas City Southern R.R., 786 So. 2d 682,694 (La. 2001)). 
211. Mallozzi v. Philadelphia Daily Newspapers, Inc., 23 Pa. D. & C.3d 761, 761 (Pa. D. & C. 
1981). 
212. Id. at 764 (citing Knierim v. Izzo, 174 N.E.2d 157, 164 (Ill. 1961)) ("drawing a line between 
slight hurts common to a complex society and severe mental disturbances resulting from intentional 
acts wholly lacking in social utility"); Forster v. Manchester, 189 A.2d 147, 151 (Pa. 1963) (finding 
that this tort is designed for acts of an especially flagrant character, as opposed to conduct having social 
value). 
213 . Lucas v. Firine, No. CV 92-0335703, 1993 WL 280306, at *l (Conn. Super. Ct. July 15, 
1993). 
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cause mental distress of a very serious kind. "'214 The court focused on the 
purpose of the conduct at issue in terms of its social utility: "[A] line can be 
drawn between the slight hurts which are the price of a complex society and the 
severe mental disturbances inflicted by intentional actions wholly lacking in 
social utility."215 Focusing on social utility, the court made it a limitation on 
emotional distress claims: "Liability has been found only where the conduct 
has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond 
all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly 
intolerable in a civilized community."216 
iv. Invasion of Privacy 
A 1963 case presents a rather different use of the social utility concept. In 
a case for invasion of privacy-where a woman was followed, her whereabouts 
noted, and her movements filmed-the court stated that such conduct is 
reasonable because it believed that there was much social utility to be gained 
from investigations for personal injury.217 InForsterv. Manchester,218 the court 
held that there was "much social utility to be gained from these 
investigations."219 The court reasoned that "[i]t is in the best interests of society 
that valid claims be ascertained and fabricated claims be exposed."220 
The court further justified this position by pointing to an act of the 
legislature: 
The legislature recognized the importance of these 
investigative activities in the Private Detective Act of 1953 
when it defined the business of a licensed private detective to 
include investigations of the "identity, habits, conduct, 
movements, whereabouts ... of any person" and, in another 
subsection when it authorized the "securing of evidence to be 
used ... in the trial of civil ... cases."221 
Relying on the act for a social utility, the court explained that "[c]ertainly, 
following the subject during her daily activities and recording on film her 
movements and whereabouts is consonant with the wording of the Act and 
214. Id. (quoting Whelan v. Whelan, 588 A.2d 251,253 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991)). 
215. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Knierim, 174 N.E.2d at 164). 
216. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS§ 46 cmt. 
d (AM. L. INST. 1965)). 
217. Forster, 189 A.2d at 150. 
218. Id. at 147. 
219. Id. at 150. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. (quoting Private Detective Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 1273, § 2(b)(2), (10), 22 P.S. 
§ 12(b)(2), (10)). 
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aforementioned social purpose."222 The court was careful to also observe that 
"[t]here was nothing unreasonable in the manner in which appellant was 
followed nor in the taking of motion pictures. In regard to the surveillance, it 
was conducted by experienced investigators who did not use improper 
techniques."223 The court held that "the social value resulting from 
investigations of personal injury claims and the absence of any willfulness on 
the part of appellee require[d] [it] to deny redress in this case."224 
v. Wrongful Death 
From the 1990s, wrongful death actions in multiple jurisdictions include an 
analysis of social utility of the actions at issue. For wrongful death complaints, 
to determine whether a duty exists requires that a court consider various factors 
including the risk involved, the foreseeability of harm as weighed against the 
social utility of the actor's conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding 
against the harm, and the consequences of placing the burden upon the actor. 
In Campbell v. Burt Toyota-Diahatsu, Inc. ,225 the court addressed a problem 
of an alleged failure to warn. The court explained: 
We first consider the foreseeability of harm resulting from 
Burt's failure to warn the Campbells that the modified seatbelt 
posed a danger to them as weighed against the social utility of 
imposing a legal duty on Burt to warn against such danger 
when it was already known to the Campbells or should have 
been known. 226 
The court found that even ifit assumed "that the foreseeability of harm resulting 
from a seat-belt modification was great, it [was] outweighed here by the lack of 
social utility in imposing a legal duty on Burt to warn of a safety hazard that 
was known or should have been known to the Campbells."227 The court 
concluded, "The safety of automobiles is of great concern, and maintaining safe 
vehicles serves an important social function. Repair shops such as Burt's serve 
that function for most of the public."228 In summary, the court held that "the 
social utility of not imposing a legal duty on Burt to warn of an obvious danger 
outweigh[ed] the foreseeability of harm in this case."229 
222. Id 
223 . Id 
224. Id at 152. 
225 . Campbell v. Burt Toyota-Diahatsu, Inc., 983 P.2d 95 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998). 
226. Id at 97. 
227. Id 
228. Id at 97-98. 
229. Id at 98. 
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D. Social Utility, Community, and the Problem of Definition 
The expansion of social utility throughout the many common law tort 
claims holds a significant risk for environmental law for three distinct reasons. 
First, social utility interjects a pro-defendant slant into tort cases. In other 
words, social utility analyses, when added to a tort analyses, will weigh in favor 
of defendants and make it more difficult for plaintiffs to win claims, however 
meritorious those claims are. This is particularly important in the context of 
the intersection of torts and environmental law. 
Environmental law lacks one significant feature at the federal level-
statutes almost never provide for any individual remedies for plaintiffs who 
have been harmed by violation of the statutes. In other words, if a plaintiff has 
developed a lung disease as a result of a toxin, which was released from a 
neighboring manufacturing facility, the plaintiff will need to file a common law 
action to be compensated for the injury. Social utility, however, may bar those 
plaintiffs from a successful claim, resulting in a justice gap for those plaintiffs. 
Second, social utility is largely undefined and left to the whims of 
individual courts. There is no standardized definition. Because social utility 
rose as a method of considering equities, it was never intended to have a specific 
definition. It was meant to be used contextually to sort out the various factors 
that might be relevant to an inquiry by a court sitting in equity. In the modem 
context, however, there is a great deal of risk to having social utility undefined. 
One can easily regard social utility as a value that fits with modem property 
theory. Social utility is about community goods and social relationships around 
property. At the same time, social utility will consistently favor defendants as 
it has been interpreted in the courts. When the courts tally social utility in terms 
of the jobs created, the tax dollars for the community, the GDP of the country, 
etc., those things are always going to favor a corporate or industrial defendant 
rather than an injured individual neighbor. That's how social utility works 
within the cases. Because social utility is undefined, it tends to be defined in 
terms of those things that are easily counted within a community: jobs, incomes, 
and tax dollars. Sustainability doesn't generally compete well in that field 
because it cannot be reduced to concrete numbers for this tax year. 
Third, social utility can be evaluated at any scale the judge chooses to 
consider. What scale do we use for evaluating benefits? Local? State? 
National? Unsurprisingly, benefits of a particular land use are often drastically 
different at those scales. And law has a bad habit of ignoring scale or treating 
jurisdiction (state and federal) as the answer to the question. 
Consider, for example, the history of the Tennessee Valley Authority's 
(TV A) mission and the environmental consequences of the agency in the 
twentieth century. When the TVA was founded, the original mission focused 
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on the local area and the provision of hydroelectricity.230 Additionally, the 
original mission was a highly socialist manifesto of addressing poverty in the 
lower Appalachian Mountains.231 The game plan was to take electricity and 
utility coops to those who didn't have them. At the same time, the statute 
mentioned plans for national replication of this experiment.232 But with the rise 
of socialism as a threat before and during World War II, the agency 
reformulated its priorities. The agency dropped any interest in Appalachian 
poverty and refocused its efforts on the national defense.233 In the process, the 
agency switched to coal-powered plants and the purchase of millions of tons of 
strip-mined coal from the region.234 Between the purchase of strip-mined coal 
and the pollution created by the coal-fired power plants (both in terms of air 
pollution and coal ash releases), the TVA became one of the greatest 
environmental threats to the region. And this was an agency whose mission 
was once clean hydroelectric power and poverty relief. What changed? Scale. 
The original mission did not define scale well, and the agency changed the scale 
for self-preservation with the rise of the World War II threat. 
Social utility presents exactly the same problem in many ways. To the 
degree that there is no set scale for evaluating utility, a judge is free to evaluate 
in any way. And the larger one evaluates utility, the less important local 
environmental impacts become. Of course, you can imagine how malleable 
social utility is and how much it fits with corporate and political norms, such as 
job creation and tax revenue. 
Enough social benefits and the plaintiff may not even be able to prove 
nuisance now, when the same case would have been decided differently 
traditionally. 
V. FORMULATING A SUSTAINABLE PROPERTY THEORY 
In the social sciences, many researchers have moved to a methodology 
known as grounded theory. Grounded theory comes from the work of Barney 
Glaser and Anselm Strauss.235 Grounded theory originates in qualitative 
sources, specifically actual experiences.236 In the context of law, grounded 
230. TENN. VALLEY AUTH., TVA TODAY 1, 7 (1975). 
231. Id. at 1. 
232. Id. at 2. 
233. TENN.VALLEY AUTH. INFO. OFF., TENN.VALLEY AUTH., A HISTORY OF THE TENNESSEE 
VALLEY AUTHORITY 19 (1983). 
234. TENN. VALLEY AUTH., supra note 230, at 42. 
235 . See generally BARNEY G . GLASER & ANSELM L. STRAUSS, THE DISCOVERY OF 
GROUNDED THEORY: STRATEGIES FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1967). 
236. Id. 
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theory serves to remind us of the importance of the cases themselves over 
scholarly commentary.237 
This Article has proceeded under a grounded theory model. Discussions 
have not focused on the nuances of how scholars want modem property theory 
to be interpreted. These discussions admittedly ignore aspirations and ideals of 
many of those authors. The point instead was to engage the modem tum toward 
social relations as it is represented, accepted, and utilized within the law, and 
particularly the case law, through recent years. 
Grounded theory pushes us away from armchair speculation and toward 
concrete experience. Climate change doesn't leave us with time for the 
armchair speculation. What is important now is how the courts treat socially-
oriented concepts of property. 
This Article has demonstrated that social relations approaches, as 
represented in the case law, have failed environmental law by (1) supporting 
such malleable concepts as social utility and (2) thinking in terms of the 
individual as opposed to society, while ignoring the land itself. Without a 
different approach to property, there is no good evidence to suggest that 
sustainability can ever win. The cards are stacked against it. 
Worse, the stakes are high when we cannot rely on federal and state 
enforcement due to either politics or economics. Common law claims give the 
American people a route to local enforcement of environmental norms when 
federal and state enforcement fails . In other words, there are moments when 
there is less enforcement because of national politics. Sometimes, there are key 
reversals of protective policies that were not enshrined in statutes. 
Alternatively, sometimes there is just a failure of enforcement. With too few 
employees, an agency simply does not have the workforce power to accomplish 
critical tasks like monitoring water quality throughout a large region. 
Regulations give us a very limited and federal or state enforcer-one that is 
highly reactive to politics. Additionally, we rely on agencies who may care but 
don't have much of a stake and who are vulnerable to lobbyists. 
With so many opportunities for legal concepts to be stretched, spun, and 
shoved just enough, key property concepts in statutes and the common law need 
explicit normative content. The failure of social relations concepts is in their 
generality, which makes them highly malleable and responsive to political 
pressures. Too much malleability means a legal concept is not truly normative. 
237. Using a grounded theory approach in this context remains somewhat novel. As Noah 
Weisbord said, "The qualitative methods of Glaser and Strauss, in spite of their internalization in other 
areas of social research, have not yet penetrated the field of law." Noah Weisbord, Conceptualizing 
Aggression, 20 DUKE J. COMPAR. & INT'L L. 1, 11 (2009). 
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What is of greater utility than providing for human survival? Social utility 
and other similar concepts must be understood in terms of sustainability. Land 
is our most fundamental home and worthy of a unique status from other types 
of property. Land is the foundation of our survival and the possibility of 
survival in the future. There isn't a plan B. Resources may be used, of course, 
but thoughtfully, with particular emphasis on the climate-related externalities. 
Survival and sustainability should unite the landowner and the public. The 
original model of traditional property theory was a model of dominion and 
control, often justified by highly sexist and exclusionary religious rhetoric. It 
set up a world that was owner against others, emphasizing individual rights as 
against the rest of society. 
Modem property theory refocused on the community and a social relations 
model of property. Notably, this is a conflict-based model-it assumes the best 
for others is never ( or rarely) best for the owner. It is a model that assumes the 
tragedy of the commons. Moreover, such a model depends on a particular view 
of human nature: one that is, ironically, highly individualistic and pessimistic. 
People want to care about only themselves and we force them to care about 
others, or at least correct them when they don't. In a way, it is almost self-
defeating: community-based solutions are employed precisely because people 
are, allegedly, individualist and resistant to community, if not incapable of it. 
This model places society in the position of the interferer with those original 
ownership and dominion rights. Additionally, given that modem property 
theory really didn't push back significantly against the prized right to exclude, 
there is constant pushback on those grounds. Regulation is seen as a violation 
of that right to exclude: regulation is seen as a reaching into property rights.238 
The conflict model is unhelpful, leaving us constantly figuring out how to 
best allocate rights and maneuver fairly through the conflict. We need a new 
model that will function for us in a climate crisis. 
The challenge isn't so insurmountable as it may seem: All of our interests 
have become united, to some degree. Wherever you live, climate change is a 
problem within your own lifetime. No location avoids all the storms, droughts, 
sea level rise, and unprecedented temperatures. No location avoids the 
increased likelihood of new pandemic viruses. Even oil and gas executives 
238. Joseph Singer made a similar argument: "The ownership model of property utterly fails to 
incorporate an understanding of property rights as inherently limited both by the property rights of 
others and by public policies designed to ensure that property rights are exercised in a manner 
compatible with the public good." Singer, supra note 36, at 7. Singer concluded, "It makes regulations 
of property appear inherently suspect. It presumes that when property rights are limited by government 
regulation, an evil has been effectuated that bears a heavy burden of justification." Id. 
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have to care when the whole world instantly goes on lockdown for months at a 
time and oil prices actually go negative.239 
The challenge of our lifetimes is to become the communal creature that I 
optimistically believe we are. The new model must prioritize the land before 
either the individual or the rest of society. Society and the individual are 
important because they are acting on land, separately and together. Focusing 
on ourselves, not the land, was central to creating the climate change era. We 
worried about pollution mostly when it impacted our own health and only 
occasionally when it impacted ecosystems. We minimized health problems that 
weren't directly human problems. Fixing the problem requires reversing that 
thought process. The focus has to be first on the land's wellbeing. Our 
wellbeing will be the critical but indirect outcome. 
If we must reword this theory in terms of social relations and community, 
survival is social; sustainable is social. If we must reword in terms of social 
utility, choices create a variety of social goods from happiness to tax dollars, 
but in the era of climate change, sustainability should weigh heavier in the 
analysis and set firm limits for externalities. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As a final matter, watching the evolution of tort and property doctrine where 
social utility is concerned should remind us that fuzziness and amenability to 
change in any legal concept is a part of our ongoing jurisprudence. Slippage is 
the norm, not the variation. Our baseline is change over time. The only 
effective way to steer that change is to imbue key legal concepts with explicit 
norms. 
Property should not be theorized in terms of amorphous progressive social 
relations but instead in terms of stewardship and survival. That survival 
relationship was more obviously true in agrarian centuries past. Economic and 
social changes have made the relationship less intuitive over time. Climate 
change is making the link more intuitive again. 
If we do not think in terms of stewardship and survival, then we are stuck 
with the status quo, where every single regulation is a fight against that norm 
of complete individual control. Every lawsuit is the owner against the world. 
Our jurisprudence entangled the malleable idea of social utility with a norm of 
industrial productivity. The tangle was less intentional, more accidental and 
political. Sometimes the tangle came from nothing more than fuzzy analysis 
and misplaced reliance on precedents. We must face these tangles and reclaim 
239. Justin Worland, Oil Prices Won 't Be Negative Forever. But the Oil Industry Will Never 
Be the Same, TIME (Apr. 20, 2020, 10:50 PM), https://time.com/5824263/coronavirus-negative-oil-
prices-consolidation/ [https:/ /perma.cc/QYX9-K873]. 
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the idea of social utility by recognizing that sustainability is not only a core 
human value but a requirement for survival. 
I want to raise this concern about property theory now because I believe we 
are about to expend a very, very precious resource that will take another fifty 
years to re-build. That resource is an increasingly mobilized society that is 
deeply concerned about human survival on this planet. I don't want to waste 
that social energy on legal changes that erode quickly. 
